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We introduce a capability-based access controlmodel integrated into a linguistic formalism
for modeling network aware systems and applications. Our access control model enables
speciﬁcation and dynamic modiﬁcation of policies for controlling process activities (mo-
bility of code and access to resources). We exploit a combination of static and dynamic
checking and of in-lined reference monitoring to guarantee absence of run-time errors
due to lack of capabilities. We illustrate the usefulness of our framework by using it for
implementing a simpliﬁed but realistic scenario. Finally, we show how the model can
be easily tailored for dealing with different forms of capability acquisition and loss, thus
enabling different possible variations of access control policies.
© 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In recent years, highly distributed networks have become a common infrastructure for many applications that exploit
network facilities to access remote resources and services. These systems (e.g., the Internet) are highly open: their overall
structure can change dynamically in unpredictable ways because the entities involved can join and leave the system at any
timeandneednotbedeﬁnedprior to starting the infrastructure. Indevelopingapplications for suchcomputingenvironments,
network awareness has emerged as a key design principle to deal with dynamic changes of network environments (e.g.,
variable guarantees for communication, cooperation, mobility, resource usage, security, etc.). Open network systems are
then fostering the development of new paradigms and programming languages with mechanisms for handling process
distribution and mobility, for coordinating process execution and interaction, and for managing resources and security. To
improve the understanding of such complexmechanisms, several foundational process calculi (e.g. distributed join-calculus
[29], Distributed π-calculus [41], Ambient calculus [14], and Seal calculus [15]) and process-based prototype languages (e.g.
Klaim [24], Lime [50] and Nomadic Pict [61]) have been devised.
Our study stems from the language Klaim (Kernel Language for Agents Interaction and Mobility), an experimental
language designed for network aware programming and implemented in Java [8]. In Klaim, a system is a network
of addressable nodes that contain running processes and data repositories. The nodes of a Klaim net do not neces-
sarily correspond to physically distributed machines; rather, they are units of abstraction for groups of processes and
data, that belong to the same logical partition of a machine or to the same class of users. Klaim communication
model builds over, and extends, Linda’s notion of generative communication through tuple spaces [31]: processes may
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communicate asynchronously by exchanging tuples (i.e. sequences) of information items through tuple spaces (i.e. multisets
of tuples); tuples are anonymous and retrieved from a tuple space by associative selection through a pattern-matching
mechanism. The Linda model, originally proposed for parallel programming on isolated machines, has later been ex-
tended with multiple, possibly distributed, tuple spaces [32] to improve modularity, scalability and performance. Indeed,
the tuple space paradigm has become a popular alternative to (more conventional) point-to-point communication ap-
proaches; this is witnessed by the many tuple space based run-time systems, both from industries (e.g. SUN JavaSpaces
[56,5] and IBM TSpaces [63]) and from universities (e.g. PageSpace [21], WCL [52], Klaim [24], Lime [50] and TuCSoN
[49]).
Coordination, distribution and mobility of programs are important aspects for programming in open environments, but
ensuring correct use of resources and data is crucial as well. Indeed, a host receiving mobile processes for execution needs
tools to control access to its resources and to protect them from misuse by the incoming processes. Therefore, to prevent
accidental or malicious manipulation of nodes’ content, Klaim has been equipped with a capability-based type system [25].
Generally speaking, a capability is an unforgeable and tamper proof token given to a subject that speciﬁes which kind of
operations on a certain object are permitted to the holder of the capability. Subjects can be, e.g., mobile processes or network
nodes; objects are resources like shareddata, ﬁles, nodes, thenetworkandso forth; access thenmeanswhatkindofoperations
can be done on these resources (e.g., producing a datum, writing or reading a ﬁle, changing the network topology, moving
about the network). In Klaim, capabilities are used to specify the access control policies stating what operations (read, write,
execute, . . .) processes are allowed to perform while running at a given node; type checking then determines if processes
comply with the policy of their hosting node. Hence, access requests are (mostly) checked statically, which is an advantage
with respect to more traditional approaches to system security. The latters usually exploit a component called reference
monitor that dynamically intercepts each attempted access to a resource; every acces is then processed by a combination of
authentication (i.e., the identiﬁcation of subject’s identity) and authorization (i.e., the decision onwhether the access should
be allowed or denied).
Deﬁning policies in terms of capabilities makes our approach well-suited for open systems, where capability-based
approaches offer more ﬂexibility than other protection mechanisms like, e.g., access control lists [60,62,20,54,45]. However,
access policies in Klaim [25] are ﬁxed prior to starting system execution and cannot be ﬂexibly modiﬁed according to its
dynamic evolution; moreover, the type system presupposes a static knowledge of the entire system. These assumptions
are unrealistic in open network systems. On one hand, access control information could be statically partial, inaccurate or
missing: for example, a component may not initially have all the information it needs to authorize an access, or a requestor
may not initially have all the necessary rights to access a resource. On the other hand, access control policies are likely to
change once programs begin their execution, for example whenever new objects are created, or existing subjects leave the
system or change duties.
To avoid illegal accesses to resources, dynamic modiﬁcations of access control information must be suitably managed. In
this paper, we show that capabilities and interprocess communication can serve this purpose. In fact, mechanisms based on
capabilities supplement the dinamicity inherent in open systems as they support introduction of user-deﬁned rights and let
subjects freely join and leave the system. Moreover, capabilities can be distributed and transferred by exploiting disciplined
communication operations. In this way, we can increase the ﬂexibility of the original Klaim capability-based access control
model with the possibility of dynamically changing policies.
Todrawattentionon thekey aspects,we leaveout fromKlaim some linguistic features thatwould complicate the technical
treatment of the protection model more than necessary; we call the resulting language μKlaim (micro Klaim), since it can
be thought of as the process calculus on which Klaim is based. In the resulting framework, subjects and objects are both
network nodes; this corresponds to the fact that the initiator of one operation can be the target of another. Moreover, instead
of directly performing an action, a process can use a capability to delegate another node the ability to perform that action. In
our setting, this passing of access rights is implemented by exploiting interprocess communication primitives, thus providing
means for controlling exchange of rights. In practice, when a node address is exchanged in a communication, a capability
on that node is passed in order to grant the receiver a set of access rights on that node. Access control policies are then
susceptible of dynamicmodiﬁcations due to, e.g., capability acquisition or consumption. Of course, capabilities are protected
from forgery: the only way for nodes and processes to obtain capabilities is to have them granted at the outset or as result
of some communication.
Executionmonitoring togetherwithmechanisms supportingmodiﬁcations at run-time of access control policies turn out
to be essential for dealing with network-aware applications such as, e.g., resource discovery and e-commerce. However, like
for the Klaim type system, wemaintain a static checking phase to reduce run-time checks and improve system performance.
In fact, we interpret access control policies as process types and develop a sort of type checking procedure that statically
checks process intentions against the local access control policy. A similar procedure is then used at run-time to check
compatibility of the intentions of a migrating process with the access policy of the destination node: only if this check
succeeds, the migrating process is sent for execution. This enhances the performance of the security monitor, but at the cost
of dynamically checking themigrating process before entrance; a further optimization could be obtained by exploiting forms
of ‘proof carrying code’ [46]. Our checking mechanisms ensure a safety property that is preserved along system evolutions:
every checked node is ‘safe’ in the sense that no process, while running at it, will ever attempt to perform an operationwhich
is not authorized by the local policy. This result ﬁts well with the key features of open systems, where ‘good’ components
usually run in hostile environments.
D. Gorla, R. Pugliese / Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming 78 (2009) 665–689 667
Table 1
μKlaim syntax.
This paper does not cover many issues in the area. We only consider authorizationmechanisms based on capabilities and
discretionary access control policies (i.e. policies based on the identity of the subject attempting the access). However, we
do not commit ourself to any speciﬁc policy; we model the mechanisms needed to enforce them, not their initial setting
up. Of the underlying distributed computing base, we assume that shared-key encryption and/or public-key encryption are
available where needed, e.g. to support scalable authentication and authorization protocols. For example, an identity and
some credentials, which represent statements certiﬁed by given entities (e.g., certiﬁcation authorities), can be associated
with every component in a system; credentials are then used to prove the component’s identity to all other components
(e.g. [23]) or can also be directly bound to authorizations (see, e.g., PolicyMaker [10], Keynote [9], REFEREE [19], DL [43]).
Cryptographic mechanisms (e.g., one-way functions like in Amoeba [58] and in ICAP [33]) can also be exploited to prevent
processes from forging new capabilities or tampering with existing ones. Finally, we also assume that node’s run-time is
reliable; in particular, its reference monitor is a tamper-proof, non-bypassable, trusted component intercepting each and
every attempted access to a system and its resources.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formally describes the syntax of μKlaim and presents an example
application inspired by a realistic publisher/subscriber scenario. The static semantics of the language is in Section 3 and its
dynamic semantics is in Section 4. Section 5 proves the correctness of our framework. Section 6 gives a full account of the
example described in Section 2. Section 7 presents some variations of the access control model where, e.g., capabilities can
be revoked, expire or whose distribution can be controlled. Section 8 contains comparisons with related work, and Section 9
concludes the paper by also arguing on a few language design issues. Appendix A reports the proofs of some technical results,
while Appendix B reports the formal deﬁnitions for the variations of Section 7.
Our presentation is incremental: the basic framework presented and discussed until Section 6 is intentionally simplistic,
since it misses several desirable and expectable features. The framework is then enhanced in Section 7, wheremore complex
features are added. We ﬁnd it useful to present our approach step-by-step, to clarify its main issues without hiding them
behind heavy notations: we start from a collaborative framework, well-suited for intranets, and then gradually move to a
more complex and realistic framework, closer to open nets.
2. The language μKlaim
μKlaim (microKlaim), is aminimal variation ofKlaim that still retains allKlaim’s distinctive features: explicit distribution
of processes and data, remote operations, process mobility and asynchronous communication through multiple distributed
data repositories. With respect to Klaim, μKlaim has a simpler syntax and operational semantics without higher-order
communication, without allocation environments for translating one kind of addresses into the other (in fact, μKlaim has
only one kind of node addresses) and with replication in place of parameterized process deﬁnitions.
The syntax of μKlaim is reported in Table 1. The use of information enabling access control (i.e. sets of access rights π ,
capability lists δ, and grantings μ) and of the highlighted constructs (which do not occur in source terms) will be explained
in Section 3. We assume a countable setN of names l, l′, . . . ,u, . . . , x, y, . . . , that can be used as localities or variables.
Notationally, we prefer letters l, l′, . . . when we want to stress the use of a name as a locality and x, y, . . . when we want to
stress the use of a name as a variable. We will use u for a generic name.
Tuples are sequences of names, each associated to a granting. Templates are patterns used to select tuples in tuple spaces.
They are sequences of names and formal ﬁelds; the latter ones are written ! x : π and are used to bind names. Processes are
the μKlaim active computational units. They are built up from the inert process nil and from ﬁve basic operations, called
actions, by using action preﬁxing, parallel composition and replication. Actions can be marked (i.e. underlined) to charge
the reference monitor with the run-time check for availability of the needed capabilities. The informal semantics of process
actions is as follows. Action in(T)@u looks for a matching tuple t in the tuple space (TS, for short) located at u. Intuitively,
a template matches against a tuple if both have the same number of ﬁelds and corresponding ﬁelds match; this happens if
both ﬁelds are the same name or one is a formal and the other one is a name. If a matching t is found, it is removed from
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Table 2
Nets structural congruence.
(Com) N1 ‖ N2 ≡ N2 ‖ N1 (Ass) (N1 ‖ N2) ‖ N3 ≡ N1 ‖ (N2 ‖ N3) (Alpha)
P =α P′
l ::δ P ≡ l ::δ P′
(Abs) l ::δ C ≡ l ::δ (C|nil)
the TS, the formal ﬁelds of T are replaced in the continuation process with the corresponding names of t and the operation
terminates; otherwise, the operation is suspended until a matching tuple becomes available. Action read(T)@u is similar but
it does not remove the selected tuple from the TS. Action out(t)@u adds the tuple t to the TS located at u. Action eval(P)@u
sends process P for execution at u. Actionnewloc(l : δ) dynamically creates a newnetwork nodewith address l and capability
list δ. Notice that newloc is the only action not indexed with an address because it always acts locally; all the other actions
explicitly indicate the (possibly remote) locality where they will take place.
Nets are ﬁnite collections of nodes where processes and tuple spaces can be allocated. A node is a triple l ::δ C, where
locality l is the address of the node, C is the (parallel) component located at l and δ is the policy of the node. Components can
be processes or (located) tuples. Located tuples (ranged over by 〈t〉) are inactive components representing tuples in a TS that
have been inserted along a computation by executing an action out.2 The TS located at l results from the parallel composition
of all tuples residing at l.
Namesoccurring inprocess terms canbeboundby actionpreﬁxes.Moreprecisely, in processes in(T)@u.P and read(T)@u.P
the preﬁxes bind the names in the formal ﬁelds of T , while in process newloc(l : δ).P the preﬁx binds l. In all these cases, P is
the scope of the bindings. A name that is not bound is called free. The sets bn(P) and fn(P) (of bound and free names, resp., of
P) are deﬁned accordingly, and so is alpha-conversion, denoted =α . With abouse of notation, we shall extend bn(·) and fn(·)
to nets, with the expected meaning.
We will identify nets which intuitively represent the same net. We therefore deﬁne structural congruence, ≡, to be the
smallest congruence relation over nets that satisﬁes the laws in Table 2. The laws say that ‖ is commutative and associative,
that alpha-convertible processes are interchangeable and that processnil can be absorbed/spawned. Notice that ≡ identiﬁes
only nets whose equality is immediately obvious from their syntactical structure and has nothing to do with the semantics
of nets (which has still to be introduced and shall rely on structural congruence).
To sketch the access control model integrated in the language, we now present a simpliﬁed but realistic pub-
lisher/subscriber scenario where our framework turns out to be expressive and elegant; this informal presentation will
be reﬁned in Section 6.
Example 2.1 Let lU be the address of a node representing the server of a given department and let lP be the address of a
node representing the publisher of some on-line publications that are stored at address lS . We want to implement a protocol
throughwhich the head of department subscribes a ‘license’ enabling all the departmentmembers to access the publications
at lS . In terms of access control, this means that the protocol must extend the policy of node lU (expressing the operations
that processes hosted at lU are allowed to perform over the net) with the capability of reading papers from lS . Hence, if the
department server starts with policy δ, upon completion of the protocol lU ’s policy should become δ[lS → {r}]; this notation
means that processes at lU can read tuples from lS ’s tuple space, while still being enabled to perform those actions enabled
by δ. Then, a department member located at lM can spawn code over lU and retrieve lP ’s papers by simply using the process
eval( read(paperTitle, !x)@lS .out(paperTitle, x)@lM )@lU
Action eval(P)@lU spawns code P for execution at lU . Then, action read(paperTitle, !x)@lS looks for a tuple matching the
template paperTitle, !x (i.e. a paper whose title is paperTitle and whose body is a text B); if such a paper is found, x is replaced
by B in the continuation process. Finally, action out(paperTitle,B)@lM inserts in lM ’s tuple space a tuple containing the paper
required by the department member whose address is lM . In a more realistic scenario, the capability ‘read’ over lS will not
be delivered forever to lU . This scenario could be modeled by exploiting some of the variations described in Section 7.
3. Static semantics
Informally, for each node of a net, say l ::δ C, the task of the access control system is to determine if the actions that C
intends to perform when running at l are enabled by the access policy δ. When asking about authorization of a particular
action, there are typically three possible outcomes: ‘yes’, the action may be executed because sufﬁcient access rights exist
in δ for the action to be approved; ‘no’, the action may not be executed because sufﬁcient access rights in δ do not exist and
cannot be acquired; ‘unknown’, sufﬁcient access rights to approve the action do not exist in δ, but they could be dynamically
2 Like in [24], here we are assuming that at the outset no tuple is present in the existing TSs. Section 3 will clarify why this simplifying assumption is
useful.
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acquired and the decision about authorization is delayed at run-time. In the latter case, run-time checks are unavoidable
and are charged to the referencemonitor (see rule (Mark) in Section 4). In our opinion, the crucial novelty of our approach is
the integration of the ‘unknown’ possibility in the static checking. Indeed, all the static analysis techniques we are aware of
either accept or reject a system/process; instead, the combination of static checking and of in-lined monitoring we propose
allows us to deal with dynamic policy modiﬁcations without compromising system performance too much.
3.1. Access rights, capabilities, capability lists and grantings
In the previous section, we have seen that access control information occurs in the syntax. Below, we brieﬂy outline how
these information are exploited. First, each name x occurring in a formal ﬁeld of the template speciﬁed as argument of an
action read/in is explicitly associated3 to a set of access rights π; these are the rights necessary to the continuation process
to perform its operations on x while running locally. Second, in actions out each name in the spawned tuple is associated
to a (possibly empty) granting μ that speciﬁes the capabilities passed through along with that name. Third, each node l ::δ C
is equipped with a capability list δ describing its access policy. Similarly, when nodes are dynamically created by actions
newloc, a capability list is used to specify their access policy.
Deﬁnition 3.1. The set of access rights, C, is {r, i, o, e} and is ranged over by c. We let  be the powerset of C and use π to
range over. Capabilities are pairs made by a locality l and a set of access rights π , written l → π . Capability lists, ranged over
by δ, and grantings, ranged over by μ, are ﬁnite partial functions mappingN to .
We use r, i, o and e to indicate the operationwhose name beginswith it. For example, e is used to control processmobility;
thus, the capability l′ → {e} in the policy of locality l enables processes running at l to perform actions eval over l′. Differently
from previous presentations, we do not use any capability to control actions newloc: to simplify notation, here we assume
that they are always enabled.
Notationally, a capability list mapping li to a non-empty πi, for i = 1, . . . , k, will be written as [li → πi]i=1,... ,k; a similar
notation is exploited also for grantings but with a different meaning. Indeed, grantings are used in actions out to specify the
capabilities to be passed through along with a node address. For example, if a process running at l retrieves a tuple 〈l′ : μ〉,
then the policy of l in enriched with the capability l′ → μ(l); the latter allows processes running at l to perform at l′ those
actions whose rights are in μ(l).
We now introduce an ordering relation over capability lists that formalizes the property that a policy is more restrictive
than another one. To this aim, we start with deﬁning an ordering over sets of access rights that will induce the desired
ordering on capability lists.
Deﬁnition 3.2. π1 	 π2 if and only if π1 ⊆ π2.
Thus, if π1 	 π2 then π2 enables at least the actions enabled by π1. However, themodelwe develop is completely parametric
with respect to the used ordering over access rights and other alternatives are possible (see, e.g. [25] or Section 7).
By taking advantage of the fact that capability lists are partial functions,we exploit the standard pointwise union of partial
functions to extend δ1 with δ2, written δ1[δ2]; this is the capability list δ with domain dom(δ1) ∪ dom(δ2) such that
δ(u)
⎧⎨
⎩
δ1(u) if u ∈ dom(δ1) − dom(δ2)
δ2(u) if u ∈ dom(δ2) − dom(δ1)
δ1(u) ∪ δ2(u) if u ∈ dom(δ1) ∩ dom(δ2)
Similarly, we exploit the standard pointwise inclusion of partial functions to order capability lists.
Deﬁnition 3.3 (Ordering). We say that δ1 is less than δ2 (or that δ2 is greater than δ1), written δ1  δ2, if δ1(l) 	 δ2(l) for every
l ∈ dom(δ1).
The ordering  formalizes the idea that, if δ1  δ2, then δ1 is a less permissive policy than δ2. Clearly,  is decidable because
we work with ﬁnite partial functions.
3.2. A capability-based access control system
The task of the static phase is to lighten the need of run-time checks as much as possible; this will be done by exploiting
all the security information occurring in the syntax of a μKlaim net. There are however checks that must be deferred at
run-time. First of all, compliance between the access control information in a tuple and that in the argument of an in/read
3 Such a set is not strictly necessary: it could be inferred by examining how the continuation process uses x. However, its presence enables a simpler
static checking.
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can only be checked when executing the action. As explained in Section 2, an action in/read succeeds only if the template
it speciﬁes, T , matches against the accessed tuple, t. Thus, we charge the matching function (that is naturally present in any
communication based on tuple spaces) with the burden of verifying access control compliance between T and t. Notice that
this is the only technical commonality between our approach and the type system in [25].
Furthermore, capabilities are dynamically acquired as a result of executing a read/in and they are used to enrich the
policy of the node where the action was ﬁred. These capabilities are exploitable by all co-located processes, and not only by
the process that performed the action. This choice has been driven by the principles underlying the notion of capabilities,
where rights are assigned to subjects that, in our framework, are network nodes. Unluckily, to make dynamic acquisition
meaningful,we need to introduce further run-time checks, because an action that is statically illegal could become legal upon
acquisition of the capability enabling it. In such cases, the static access control mechanism simply marks (i.e. underlines)
the action to require its checking at run-time by the reference monitor. This explains the use of the construct a.P in Table 1,
where action a that preﬁxes process P is underlined. Notationally, we will write P (C and N, resp.) to emphasise that process
P (component C and net N, resp.) may contain marked actions.
The marking mechanism never applies to actions whose targets are names bound by in/read, because such actions can
be statically checked. For example, our system has to reject node
l1 ::[l′ →{r}] read(!x : {o})@l′.read(!y)@x
because r does not belong to the annotation of x, while it has to accept node
l2 ::[l′ →{r}] read(!x : {o})@l′.out(t)@l′
because action out(t)@l′ can be marked and checked at run-time. In fact, if x is dynamically replaced with l′, l2 will acquire
the access right o over l′ and the process running at l2 can proceed; otherwise, the process will be suspended. In our system,
the dynamic acquisition of capabilities is exploited exactly for relaxing the static checking and admitting nodes like l2 while
requiring on (part of) them a run-time checking.
Finally, when performing actions out, the grantings occurring within the argument must be checked. This is necessary to
avoid capability forging like in
l ::δ out(l′ : [l → π ])@l.in(!x : π)@l
where [l′ → π ]  δ. If the ﬁrst action was legal, the second action would add new capabilities to δ and l would enlarge its
policy autonomously. To avoid this access control breach, we must ensure that action out is executed only if π 	 δ(l′). If
this check was performed statically, then dynamically acquired capabilities could not be passed any longer and would be
dealt with differently from those statically owned; this somehow collides with discretionary access control policies, where
a dynamically received capability becomes a ﬁrst-class capability (that must be handled like statically assigned ones).
We now formally deﬁne the static checking. It is deﬁned in terms of judgments for components of the form  L
l
C  C.
Here, L is a ﬁnite set of names and it is used to keep track of bound names that have been freed during the inference as
the result of removing a binding operator, i.e. in/read/newloc; this information will be used by the inference to determine
if a given action must be marked. The context  is a capability list that collects together the capabilities contained in the
policy of l and the annotations for the names that have been freed in C. Intuitively, the judgment  L
l
C  C states that,
when C is located at l, the unmarked actions in C are admissible w.r.t. . Instead, the marked actions in C cannot be deemed
legal at compile time but could become permissible at run-time, after dynamic acquisition of the necessary capabilities (via
execution of actions in/read performed at l). When L is empty, we shall simply write  l C  C.
To update a context with the sets of access rights speciﬁed within a template, we use the auxiliary function upd that
behaves like the identity function for all ﬁelds but for template formal ﬁelds. Formally, it is deﬁned by:
upd (, T)
⎧⎨
⎩
upd (upd (, T1), T2) if T = T1, T2
 unionmulti [x → π ] if T = ! x : π ,
 otherwise
Here, notation δ1 unionmulti δ2 denotes pointwise union of partial functions with disjoint domains.
Notation 3.4 Given an action a different from newloc, we use arg(a) to denote its argument, tgt(a) its target location and
ar(a) the access right corresponding to a. For example, if a is out(t)@l, then we have arg(a)  t, tgt(a) l and ar(a) o.
Judgments are inferred by using the rules in Table 3. The function markL(·) for marking process actions is deﬁned as
follows:
markL(a)
{
a if {ar(a)} 	 (tgt(a))
a if {ar(a)} 	(tgt(a)) and tgt(a) ∈ L
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Table 3
Static access control mechanism.
(T-nil)  L
l
nil  nil (T-dat)  L
l
〈t〉  〈t〉 (T-rcv) ar(a)∈{i,r} upd (,arg(a))
L∪bn(arg(a))
l
P  P
L
l
a.P  markL(a).P
(T-par)
L
l
C1  C1 Ll C2  C2
L
l
C1 |C2  C1 |C2
(T-repl)
L
l
P  P
L
l
* P  * P (T-mrcv)
ar(a)∈{i,r} upd (,arg(a))L∪bn(arg(a))
l
P  P
L
l
a.P  a.P
(T-snd)
ar(a)∈{o,e} L
l
P  P
L
l
a.P  markL(a).P
(T-msnd)
ar(a)∈{o,e} L
l
P  P
L
l
a.P  a.P (T-new)
δunionmulti[l′ →(l)] unionmulti[l′ →(l)] L∪{l′ }
l
P  P
lnewloc(l′ :δ).P  newloc(l′ :δ).P
where 	 denotes the negation of 	 . Condition tgt(a) ∈ L distinguishes actions using localities as target from those using
freed names, marking the former ones and rejecting the latter ones (as previously explained).
The rules in Table 3 should be quite explicative; we only remark a few points. Rule (T-dat) says that located tuples always
successfully pass the static checking, regardless their contents. This choice simpliﬁes the technical development; however,
to check grantings therein, we require that no tuple be present in the net at the outset (data must all be produced via actions
out, that are dynamically checked). Rule (T-par) deals both with process composition and with component composition,
while rule (T-repl) deals with replication. Rule (T-snd) deals with out and eval; notice that checking the arguments of these
actions is deferred at run-time. Rule (T-rcv) deals with in and read; the annotations in the formal ﬁelds of the template
are used to enrich the current context in order to check the continuation process. Rules (T-msnd) and (T-mrcv) are similar
to rules (T-snd) and (T-rcv), respectively, but allow a process to already contain marked actions. Action newloc is dealt
with differently from the other actions by rule (T-new). Recall that it is always performed locally and that, for the sake of
simplicity, we assume it is always enabled. However, to actually enable the creation, the speciﬁed access policy δ must be
in agreement with the access policy of the node executing the operation extended with the ability of performing over l′ all
the operations allowed locally. This is needed to prevent a malicious node from forging capabilities by creating a new node
with more powerful capabilities where sending a process that takes advantage of the capabilities not owned by the creator.
Notice also that the creating node is assumed to have over the created one all the capabilities it owns on itself.
We now state an important property of the inference system of Table 3, namely that it is decidable. Its proof is given in
Appendix A.
Proposition 3.5 (Decidability). For any , L, l, C and C ′ it is decidable to determine whether the judgment  L
l
C  C ′ holds true
or not.
The proof of Proposition 3.5 is constructive because it also gives an algorithm that, for any , L, l and C determines the C ′
with the smallest number of marked actions such that the judgment  L
l
C  C ′ holds. The complexity of the algorithm is
linear in the number of operators in C.
We will deem admissible those nets for which the static inference mechanism successfully terminate, as deﬁned below.
Deﬁnition 3.6. A net is admissible if, for each node l ::δ C, there exists a component C such that δ l C  C.
4. Dynamic semantics
The ﬁrst ingredient we need for deﬁning the operational semantics is a mechanism to control the capabilities passed
through while executing an action out from node l′. This check is deﬁned as the predicate [[ · ]]δ , that can be inferred by
using the rules in Table 4. [[ · ]]δ is parameterized with respect to δ, the policy of the node l′ where the action out takes place.
Intuitively, whenever a tuple passes the access rights πi over l to li (thus, the tuple is of the form 〈l : [li → πi]〉), we need to
verify that l′ owns πi.
Another ingredient we need is a formal way to say that a template and a tuple do match. The pattern-matching function,
matchδ
l
, is deﬁned by the rules in Table 5; it is parameterized with the locality l and the access control policy δ of the
node where it is invoked. A successful matching returns a capability list, used to extend the policy δ of the node l with the
capabilities delivered by the tuple, and a substitution, used to assign names to variables in the process invoking thematching.
We use σ to range over substitutions (with ﬁnite domain) of names for names,  to denote the ‘empty’ substitution and ◦
to denote substitutions composition. As usual, substitution application may require alpha-conversion to avoid capturing of
free names.
Notice that the node where the read/in is executed must be authorized to access all the names occurring in the selected
tuple; this is explicitly required in the premise of rule (M1) and implicitly required by the fact that the μ(l) in the premise of
rule (M2) must be deﬁned. This feature constraints the nodes from where tuples can be accessed (see Section 6). Moreover,
rule (M2) ensures that a formal ﬁeld can be replaced by a locality l
′ only if π is enabled by the union of the access rights over
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Table 4
Rules to check grantings.
μ = [li → πi]i=1,... ,k ∀ i = 1, . . . , k . πi 	 δ(l)
[[ l : μ ]]δ
[[ t1 ]]δ [[ t2 ]]δ
[[ t1, t2 ]]δ
Table 5
Matching rules.
(M1)
l ∈ dom(μ)
matchδl (l
′ , l′ : μ) = 〈[ ], 〉
(M2)
π 	 δ(l′) ∪ μ(l)
matchδl (! x : π , l′ : μ) = 〈[l′ → π ], [l
′
/x]〉
(M3)
matchδl (T1, t1) = 〈δ1, σ1〉 matchδl (T2, t2) = 〈δ2, σ2〉
matchδl ( (T1, T2) , (t1, t2) ) = 〈δ1[δ2], σ1 ◦ σ2〉
l′ owned by l and of the access rights over l′ delivered to l by the tuple. The capabilities delivered by the tuple are then used
to enrich the capabilities of l over l′.
Functionmatchδ
l
satisﬁes the following property, whose proof can be easily done by induction on the number of ﬁelds of
the ﬁrst argument of the function.
Proposition 4.1. If matchδ
l
(T , t) = 〈δ′, σ 〉 with dom(σ ) = {xi}i∈I , then δ′ = [li → πi]i∈I where, for every i ∈ I, ! xi : πi is a ﬁeld of T ,
li : μi is the corresponding ﬁeld of t and σ(xi) = li.
As we already said, the operational semantics relates μKlaim nets that may contain evaluated tuples andmarked actions.
It is given by a reduction relation,, which is the least relation induced by the rules in Table 6. Net reductions are deﬁned
over conﬁgurations of the form L  N, where L is such that fn(N) ⊆ L ⊂ﬁnN. In a conﬁguration L  N, L keeps track of the
names occurring inN and is needed to ensure global freshness of new addresses. For the sake of readability, when a reduction
does not generate any fresh address we write N N′ instead of L  N L  N′.
Let us comment on the rules in Table 6. Rule (Out) says that, before adding a tuple to a TS, the grantings within the tuple
must be checked according to the policy δ of the node where the action is performed. Rule (Eval) says that a process is
allowed to migrate only if it complies with the access policy of the target node. During this preliminary check, some process
actions could be marked to be effectively checked before execution. Rules (In) and (Read) say that the process performing
the operation can proceed only if pattern-matching succeeds. In this case, the access policy of the receiving node is enriched
with the capability list returned by the matching mechanism and the substitution returned along with the capability list is
applied to the continuation of the process performing the operation (and in the annotations therein). In rule (New), the set
L of localities already in use is exploited to verify that l′ is a fresh address. Notice that the policy of the creator is properly
updated and the address of the newnode is not initially known to any other node in thenet; thus, l′ canbeusedby the creating
process as a sort of private resource (that, of course, can be later communicated to other processes). Rule (Repl) says that
copies of a replicated process can be freely spawned. Rule (Mark) says that the in-lined reference monitor stops execution
whenever the capability for executing a is missing. Rule (Split) transforms a parallel over components into a parallel over
net nodes.4 Rules (Par) and (Struct) are standard: the former says that, if part of a composed net evolves, the whole net
evolves accordingly and the latter says that structural congruent nets have the same reductions.
Notice that the operational semantics presented so far is not intended to be the speciﬁcation of how an actual implemen-
tation of the language should work. For example, repeatedly checking marked actions is useless and would degrade system
performance. This problem can be avoided by exploiting an event-driven programming style: an event is associated to the
acquisition of a given access right and marked actions are inserted in the associated event-listeners list.
We end this section by presenting two properties of the operational semantics, whose proofs can be found in Appendix A;
as usual, we shall write * to denote the reﬂexive and transitive closure of  . The ﬁrst result relates the set L in a
conﬁguration L  N to the names occurring in the net obtained after a reduction step. The second result states that, if we start
with a net where pairwise distinct nodes have different addresses, such a property is preserved along reductions. Nets of this
kind will be called well-formed and guarantee that each network node has a single access control policy, a very reasonable
assumption in our setting. If not differently speciﬁed, in the sequel we shall only consider well-formed nets.
4 This permits splitting the parallel components running at a node and thus enables the application of the main reduction rules that, in fact, can only be
used when there is a single process running at l. Moreover, by possibly using axiom (Abs) in Table 2, (Split) enables the use of axioms (Out), (Eval), (In)
and (Read) also for execution of local operations. In conclusion, (Split) permits a compact and general formulation of the reduction rules without the need
of explicitly considering all the parallel components running at a node and of having different rules for local and remote operations.
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Table 6
μKlaim operational semantics.
(Out)
[[ t ]]δ
l ::δ out(t)@l′.P ‖ l′ ::δ′ C ′  l ::δ P ‖ l′ ::δ′ C ′ |〈t〉
(Eval)
δ′ l′ Q  Q
l ::δ eval(Q )@l′.P ‖ l′ ::δ′ C ′  l ::δ P ‖ l′ ::δ′ C ′ |Q
(In)
matchδl (T , t) = 〈δ′′ , σ 〉
l ::δ in(T)@l′.P ‖ l′ ::δ′ 〈t〉 l ::δ[δ′′ ] Pσ ‖ l′ ::δ′ nil
(Read)
matchδl (T , t) = 〈δ′′ , σ 〉
l ::δ read(T)@l′.P ‖ l′ ::δ′ 〈t〉 l ::δ[δ′′ ] Pσ ‖ l′ ::δ′ 〈t〉
(New)
l′ ∈ L
L  l ::δ newloc(l′ : δ′).P L ∪ {l′}  l ::δ[l′ →δ(l)] P ‖ l′ ::δ′ nil
(Repl) l ::δ *P l ::δ P |*P
(Mark)
l′ = tgt(a) {ar(a)} 	 δ(l′) l ::δ a.P ‖ l′ ::δ
′
C ′  N
l ::δ a.P ‖ l′ ::δ′ C ′  N
(Split)
L  l ::δ C1 ‖ l ::δ C2 ‖ N L′  l ::δ′ C ′1 ‖ l ::δ C ′2 ‖ N′
L  l ::δ C1|C2 ‖ N L′  l ::δ′ C ′1|C ′2 ‖ N′
(Par)
L  N1 L′  N′1
L  N1 ‖ N2 L′  N′1 ‖ N2
(Struct)
N ≡ N1 L  N1 L′  N2 N2 ≡ N′
L  N L′  N′
Proposition 4.2. If L  N L′  N′ and fn(N) ⊆ L then fn(N′) ⊆ L′.
Proposition 4.3. If N is well-formed, fn(N) ⊆ L and L  N* L′  N′, then N′ is well-formed.
5. Correctness
We start by introducing the notion of executable nets; these are nets already containing all necessary marks, as if they
have already passed a static checking phase.
Deﬁnition 5.1. A net is executable if, for each node l ::δ C, it holds that δ l C  C (that, for the sake of readability, will be
written as δ l C).
Notice that executable nets are admissible. Our main results will be stated in terms of executable nets; indeed, due to the
dynamic acquisition of capabilities, well-formed nets that are statically deemed admissible can still give rise to run-time
errors. However, by marking those actions that should be checked at run-time, admissible (and well-formed) nets can be
transformed into executable nets that, instead, cannot give rise to run-time errors (see Theorem 5.7).
We ﬁrst prove some results, i.e. weakening and substitutivity, which are standard for the theory of type systems.
Lemma 5.2 (Weakening). If  L
l
C then [′] L
l
C.
Proof. The proof consists in mimicking for [′] L
l
C the derivation of  L
l
C. The process actions enabled by  or those
not enabled by ′ will have the same judgments w.r.t. both  and [′]; on the contrary, actions enabled by ′ but not by 
will be checked w.r.t. [′] using rules (T-snd)/(T-rcv) in place of rules (T-msnd)/(T-mrcv). 
Lemma 5.3 (Substitutivity). If  L
l
C then, for any substitution σ , σ L′
l
Cσ , where L′ = L − dom(σ ).
Proof. The proof is by induction on length of the inference of the judgment. The base cases (i.e., rules (T-nil) and (T-dat))
are trivial. Let us examine the case in which the last rule used is (T-rcv) (the cases for (T-repl), (T-par), (T-snd), (T-new),
(T-msnd) and (T-mrcv) are similar or easier). Byhypothesis,wehave thatC = a.Q and L
l
a.Q , for someprocessQ and action
a such that ar(a) ∈ {i, r}, {ar(a)} 	 (tgt(a)) and upd (, arg(a)) L∪bn(arg(a))l Q . Without loss of generality, we can assume
that dom(σ ) ∩ bn(arg(a)) = ∅ (otherwise, if this is not the case, we could rename the bound names); thus we have (a.Q )σ =
aσ.Qσ . Now, by induction, we have that (upd (, arg(a)))σ L′′
l
Qσ , where L′′ = (L ∪ bn(arg(a))) − dom(σ ) = (L − dom(σ )) ∪
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bn(arg(a)) = L′ ∪ bn(arg(a)). Now, upd (σ , arg(aσ)) L′′
l
Qσ (indeed, it is easy to prove that (1[2])σ = (1σ)[2σ ]) and, by
applying rule (T-rcv), we conclude that σ L′
l
aσ .Qσ , i.e. σ L′
l
Cσ . 
Differently from [25] and from most type systems for calculi for network programming, the access control model we
deﬁne in this paper permits a local formulation of correctness. To this aim, we deﬁne the restriction of a net N to a set of
localities S, written N|S , as the subnet obtained from N by deleting all those nodes whose addresses are not in S. Now we
prove that the property of a net of being executable is an invariant both of the structural congruence and of the reduction
relation.
Lemma 5.4. If N|S is executable and N ≡ N′ then N′|S is executable.
Proof. Bymutual induction on the length of the inferences forN ≡ N′ andN′ ≡ N. The base case covers the axioms in Table 2.
The cases of (Com) and (Ass) trivially follow by deﬁnition, the case for (Alpha) follows from the fact that the static checking
is not affected if we consistently rename bound names within a net, and the case for (Abs) is simple. Reﬂexivity is trivial,
while the inductive steps, i.e. symmetry, transitivity and context closure, are easy. 
Theorem 5.5 (Subject reduction). If N|S is executable and L  N L′  N′ for fn(N) ⊆ L, then N′|S′ is executable, where S′ =
S ∪ (L′ \ L).
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the length of the inference of L  N L′  N′.
Base Step: We reason by case analysis on the axioms (i.e. the ﬁrst six rules) of Table 6.
(Out). In this case, S′ = S because L′ = L. Then, we have three possible sub-cases:
• Both l and l′ belong to S. In this case, N|S = N; since by hypothesis N|S is executable, we have that δ l out(t)@l′.P
and δ′ l′ C ′. By rule (T-snd), we have that δ l P. Moreover, by applying (T-par) to δ′ l′ C ′ and to δ′ l′ 〈t〉 (axiom
(T-dat)), we get that δ′ l′ C ′ | 〈t〉. This sufﬁces to conclude that N′|S(= N′) is executable.
• Neither l nor l′ belong to S. In this case, N′|S does not contain any node and, hence, is trivially executable.
• One between l and l′ belongs to S. This case can be obtained by combining the previous two ones.
(Eval). This case is similar to the previous one. Just notice that, if l′ ∈ S, we can prove δ′ l′ P′ | Q ′ by applying (T-par) to
δ′ l′ P′, that holds by hypothesis, and to δ′ l′ Q  Q ′, that is the premise of rule (Eval).
(In). In this case, theproof isnon-trivial only if l ∈ S; so, letusassumethat l ∈ S andprove that δ[δ′′] l Pσ . Byhypothesis,we
have that δ l in(T)@l′.P, where rule (T-rcv) has been the last one applied to infer the judgment; hence, we also have
that upd (δ, T) bn(T)
l
P. By deﬁnition, if {xi : πi}i∈I are the formal ﬁelds of T , we have that upd (δ, T) = δ unionmulti [xi → πi]i∈I .
Moreover, by the premise of rule (In) and by Proposition 4.1, we have that matchδ
l
(T , t) = 〈δ′′, σ 〉, where δ′′ = [li →
πi]i∈I andσ = [li/xi]i∈I . Now,upd (δ, T) = δ unionmulti [xi → πi]i∈I implies thatupd (δ, T)σ = δ[li → πi]i∈I = δ[δ′′]. Thus, byapplying
Lemma 5.3 to upd (δ, T) bn(T)
l
P, we conclude that δ[δ′′] l Pσ .
(Read). Similar to the previous case.
(New). In this case, S′ = S ∪ {l′}. If l ∈ S, we trivially conclude, since δ′ l′ nil. Otherwise, by hypothesis we have that
δ l newloc(l′ : δ′).P, where rule (T-new) has been the last one applied to infer the judgment. Hence we also have
that δ unionmulti [l′ → δ(l)] {l′}
l
P. The thesis follows by using Lemma 5.3 with substitution σ = [l′/l′].
(Repl). If l ∈ S, the case is trivial. Otherwise, δ l * P, that holds by hypothesis, implies that δ l P; the thesis follows by
applying rule (T-par).
Inductive Step: We reason by case analysis on the last applied operational rule of Table 6.
(Mark). If l ∈ S, then trivially (l ::δ a.P ‖ l′ ::δ′ C ′)|S is executable and the thesis follows by induction. Otherwise, we have
that δ l a.P; we explicitly consider only the case where a is a in or read (the case for out or eval is slightly easier).
Due to the form of the process involved in the judgment, rule (T-mrcv) has been the last one applied to deduce
the judgment; hence we also have that upd (δ, arg(a)) bn(arg(a))
l
P. By the premise of (Mark), we have that, when
the reduction takes place, {ar(a)} 	 δ(tgt(a)). Hence, by applying (T-rcv), we can derive δ l a.P; this implies that
(l ::δ a.P ‖ l′ ::δ′ C ′)|S is executable. The thesis now follows by induction.
(Split). Like in the previous case, the proof is non-trivial only if l ∈ S. In this case, we have that δ l C1|C2. Due to the form
of the process involved in the judgment, rule (T-par) has been the last one applied to deduce the judgment; hence
we also have that δ l C1 and δ l C2. Thus, we have that (l ::δ C1 ‖ l ::δ C2 ‖ N)|S is executable and, by induction, we
get that (l ::δ′ C ′
1
‖ l ::δ C ′
2
‖ N′)|S′ is executable. It is easy to prove that δ  δ′; thus, δ′ = δ[δ′′] for some δ′′. Now, the
thesis directly follows by using Lemma 5.2.
(Par). The fact that (N1 ‖ N2)|S is executable (that holds by hypothesis) implies that both N1|S and N2|S are executable. By
induction,N′
1
|S′ is executable. Moreover, we can prove thatN2|S′ = N2|S . Indeed, if S′ = S the claim is straightforward;
if S′ /= S, we have that S′ = S ∪ {l′}, for some l′ ∈ L, and we can conclude by the fact that fn(N2) ⊆ L. Thus, (N′1 ‖ N2)|S′
is executable.
(Struct). From the hypothesis, N|S is executable and N ≡ N1; by Lemma 5.4, it follows that N1|S is executable too. Now,
by induction, we get that N2|S′ is executable. From this fact and from the hypothesis N2 ≡ N′, again by Lemma 5.4, it
follows that N′|S′ is executable. 
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Table 7
Run-time error.
(ErrAct)
{ar(a)} 	 δ(tgt(a))
l::δa.P↑l (ErrPar)
N↑l
N‖N′↑l (ErrStr)
N≡N′ N′↑l
N↑l
Now, we introduce the notion of run-time error and prove safety, i.e. that executable nets do not give rise to run-time
errors. Run-time errors are deﬁned by the rules in Table 7 in terms of predicate N ↑ l that holds truewhen a process P located
at a node in N with address l attempts to perform an action a that is not allowed by the policy δ of the node. The rules are
straightforward. Notice that, sincemarked actions are checked at run-time, they cannot give rise to run-time errors. At most,
when their execution is not permitted, the process that is trying to execute them is blocked, waiting for the acquisition of
the corresponding capabilities by a parallel process running at the same node.
Theorem 5.6 (Safety). If N|S is executable then N ↑ l for no l ∈ S.
Proof. We prove the contrapositive, i.e. that if N ↑ l for some l ∈ S then N|S is not executable. The proof is by induction on
the length of the inference of N ↑ l .
Base Step: In this case, the error is generated by using axiom (ErrAct). This means that N is a node of the form l ::δ a.P,
for l ∈ S, and {ar(a)} 	δ(tgt(a)). Therefore, node l ::δ a.P, and hence N|S , is not executable otherwise action awould
have been marked (see rules (T-snd) and (T-rcv) in Table 3, and the deﬁnition of functionmark).
Inductive Step: By case analysis on the last error rule used.
(ErrPar). By induction on the premise N ↑ l of the rule,we have thatN|S is not executable. Hence, by deﬁnition, (N ‖ N′)|S
is not executable.
(ErrStr). By induction on the premise N′ ↑ l of the rule, we have that N′|S is not executable. Then the thesis follows from
the premise N ≡ N′ by using Lemma 5.4. 
Therefore, executable nets cannot immediately give rise to run-time errors. Now, by combining together the results shown
so far, we get that executable nets never generate run-time errors along sequences of reductions.
Theorem5.7 (Correctness). If N|S is executable and L  N* L′  N′ for fn(N) ⊆ L, then for no l ∈ S ∪ (L′ \ L) it holds that N′ ↑ l .
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the length of L  N* L′  N′. The base step is Theorem 5.6, while the inductive
step follows from Theorems 5.5 and 5.6. 
To conclude, notice that a more traditional correctness result that involves the static checking of the whole net can be
obtained simply by taking S = fn(N). However, we insist that our formulation of correctness better ﬁts the key features of
open systems, where ‘good’ components usually run in hostile environments.
6. Example: subscribing on-line publications
In this section, we take up the publisher/subscriber scenario of Example 2.1 to show the μKlaim’s programming style and
to illustrate a way to exploit its access control mechanism for enforcing access policies. For programming convenience, we
shall assume integers and strings to be basic values of the language and omit trailing occurrences of process nil. Moreover,
to suitably identify and refer to processes, we shall use notation A P to assign the name A to the process P.
Suppose that a user U wants to subscribe a ‘license’ to enable accessing on-line publications of a given publisher P. To
model this scenario we use three localities, lU , lP and lS , respectively associated to U, P and to the repository containing
P’s on-line accessible publications. First of all, U sends a subscription request to P including its address (together with the
access right o) and credit card number; then, U waits for a tuple that will deliver it the access right r needed to access P’s
publications and proceeds with the rest of its activity. The behaviour described so far is implemented by the process
AU  out(‘‘Subscr’’, lU : [lP → {o}],CrCrd)@lP .in(‘‘Acc’’, !x : {r})@lU .R
where process R may contain operations like read(. . . )@lS . Once P has received the subscription request and checked (by
possibly using a thirdparty authority) the validity of thepayment information, it givesU anaccess right r over lS . P’s behaviour
is modeled by the following process:
AP  * in(‘‘Subscr’’, !x : {o}, !y)@lP .check credit card y of x and require the payment .out(‘‘Acc’’, lS : [x → {r}])@x
Concretely, the access right r will be delivered to U for a limited period of time (for example, annual subscriptions would
obtain access rights valid for one year) or for a limited number of accesses. In Section 7.2 we shall present some simple ways
to implement these features in our setting.
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For processes AU and AP to behave in the expected way, the underlying net architecture, namely distribution of processes
and access control policies, must be appropriately conﬁgured. A suitable net is:
lU ::[lU →C, lP →{o}] AU ‖ lP ::[lP →C,lS →{o,i,r}] AP ‖ lS ::[ ] 〈paper1〉 | 〈paper2〉 | · · · (1)
wherewehave intentionally usedAUto emphasize the fact that the static checkingmight havemarked someactions occurring
in AU , e.g. actions read(. . . )@lS in R. Upon completion of the protocol, the net will be
lU ::[lU →C,lP →{o},lS →{r}] R ‖ lP ::[lP →C,lS →{o,i,r},lU →{o}] AP ‖ lS ::[ ] 〈paper1〉 | 〈paper2〉 | · · ·
Now consider the net
lU ::δ Q ‖ lP ::[lP →C,lS →{o,i,r}] AP ‖ lS ::[ ] 〈paper1〉 | 〈paper2〉 | · · · (2)
If we can make assumptions on the policy δ, we can exploit our framework to state and guarantee some security properties.
• If e ∈ δ(lP) and i ∈ δ(ls), availability of P’s papers is guaranteed in that only P can remove data from lS , whatever process
Q is. Indeed, Q could remove papers from lS either by inputting them or by migrating at a node where this is allowed
(viz., lP). In the ﬁrst case,Q  in(paper)@lS .Q ′, for someQ ′, where the action is marked because i ∈ δ(lS) and the net in
(2) is executable. At run-time, the reference monitor will block Q for ever, since i ∈ δ(lS) and nobody in (2) is willing to
pass the capability lS → {i} around. In the second case, Q  eval(in(paper)@lS)@lP .Q ′, for some Q ′, and we can reason
in a similar way.
• Similarly, if e ∈ δ(lP) and o ∈ δ(ls), integrity of P’s papers is ensured, in that only P can add data to lS .
To conclude this section, we want to remark some features of this example that shed light on some peculiarities of our
framework.
1. P’s papers cannot be safely put in lP ’s TS because otherwise the integrity of P’s publications could be compromised
by the execution at lU of the legal process out(not−a−P−paper)@lP . Indeed, our capability lists are not so reﬁned to
restrict the kind of tuples over which actions can operate: if out(‘‘Subscr’’, lU : [lP → {o}],CrCrd)@lP has to be enabled,
then also out(not−a−P−paper)@lP will be enabled: the executable net
lU ::δ out(not−a−P−paper)@lP ‖ lP ::[lP →C] 〈paper1〉 | 〈paper2〉 | · · ·
evolves into
lU ::δ nil ‖ lP ::[lP →C] 〈paper1〉 | 〈paper2〉 | . . . | 〈not−a−P−paper〉
where U has placed in lP a paper not published by P. This problem can be avoided by exploiting the more reﬁned
policies we have introduced in [34].
2. Knowledge of address lS is not enough for reading papers, the access right r is needed: access control in μKlaim does
not rely on name knowledge but on access control policies. Indeed, a process Q  read(paper)@lS .Q ′, for some Q ′,
placed at lU in (2) never reads papers, assuming that r ∈ δ(lS).
3. Once the access right r over lS has been acquired, all processes eventually spawned at lU can access P’s on-line
publications. In other terms, U obtains a sort of ‘site license’ valid for all processes running at lU . This fact should not
be considered as an access control breach: indeed, in order to enter lU , a mobile process could be required to exhibit
some credential (e.g. a password [44]), that however we do not model in our framework. Moreover, notice that this
way of handling privileges is different from [25], where, by using the same protocol, U would have obtained a sort of
‘individual license’ for process R. In the next sectionwewill present variations of our framework that permit delivering
different capabilities to processes running at the same node.
4. The licensedeliveredbyP toU canbeusedonly at lU since thegrantingassociated to lS onlydelivers to lU the access right
r over lS . Moreover, no intruder can remotely interfere with the protocol between the user and the publisher because
the tuple 〈‘‘Acc’’, lS : [lU → {r}]〉 located at lU can only be retrieved by processes running at lU (see rules (M1) and (M2)
in Table 5). Indeed, if we add to (1) the node l′ ::δ′ in(‘‘Acc’’, lS)@lU aiming atmounting a denial of service attack against
lU , such a nodewill not achieve its goal even if i ∈ δ′(lU). A similar argument holds for the tuple 〈‘‘Subscr’’, . . .〉 inserted
by AU at lP .
7. Variations on capabilities management
Up to now, capabilities are always acquired by the node hosting the process performing actions in/read, and not by the
process itself. This may be adequate in some scenarios, e.g. when a department subscribes a ‘site license’ (i.e. valid for all
its members), and unrealistic in others, e.g. when a mobile process has to buy a good on behalf of its owner. Moreover,
capabilities can only increase; this is unsuitable to control wastable resources where one usually wants to count the number
of times a given resource is used or to deliver accesses for a limited period of time.
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Table 8
Acquisition by processes: operational semantics.
(Out’)
[[ t ]]δ[δ1 ]
l ::δ {{out(t)@l′ .P }}δ1 ‖ l′ ::δ
′AC
′  l ::δ {{ P }}δ1 ‖ l′ ::δ
′AC
′ |〈t〉
(Eval’)
δ′ [δ1] l′ Q  Q
l ::δ {{ eval(Q )@l′ .P }}δ1 ‖ l′ ::δ
′AC
′  l ::δ {{ P }}δ1 ‖ l′ ::δ
′AC
′ |{{Q }}δ1
(In’)
match
δ[δ1 ]
l
(T , t) = 〈δ′′ , σ 〉
l ::δ {{ in(T)@l′ .P }}δ1 ‖ l′ ::δ
′ 〈t〉 l ::δ {{ Pσ }}δ1 [δ′′ ] ‖ l′ ::δ
′
nil
(Read’)
match
δ[δ1 ]
l
(T , t) = 〈δ′′ , σ 〉
l ::δ {{ read(T)@l′ .P }}δ1 ‖ l′ ::δ
′ 〈t〉 l ::δ {{ Pσ }}δ1 [δ′′ ] ‖ l′ ::δ
′ 〈t〉
(New’)
l′ ∈ L
L  l ::δ {{newloc(l′ : δ′).P }}δ1  L ∪ {l′}  l ::δ {{ P }}δ1 [l′ →δ1(l)] ‖ l′ ::δ
′
nil
(Repl’) l ::δ {{ * P }}δ1  l ::δ {{ P |*P }}δ1
(Mark’)
l′ = tgt(a) {ar(a)} 	 δ1(l′) l ::δ {{ a.P }}δ1 ‖ l′ ::δ
′AC
′  N
l ::δ {{ a.P }}δ1 ‖ l′ ::δ
′AC
′  N
(Split′
1
)
L  l ::δAC1 ‖ l ::δAC2 ‖ N L′  l ::δAC
′
1 ‖ l ::δAC
′
2 ‖ N′
L  l ::δAC1|AC2 ‖ N L′  l ::δAC
′
1|AC
′
2 ‖ N′
(Split′
2
)
L  l ::δ {{ P }}δ1 ‖ l ::δ {{Q }}δ1 ‖ N L′  l ::δ {{ P′ }}δ2 ‖ l ::δ {{Q }}δ1 ‖ N′
L  l ::δ {{ P|Q }}δ1 ‖ N L′  l ::δ {{ P′ }}δ2 | {{Q }}δ1 ‖ N
plus rules (Par) and (Struct) from Table 6 [[ · ]]_ is deﬁned in Table 4 andmatch_l (·, ·) is deﬁned in Table 5.
In the next two subsections, we will show that our framework can be smoothly tailored for taking into account these
different scenarios. For each variation, we shall ﬁrst describe the scenario we want to model from an operational point of
view and present a concrete motivating example. Then, we shall discuss how the access control model can be tailored to
preserve the results of Section 5.
Finally, in the last subsection we consider an orthogonal but realistic variation where some capabilities cannot be passed
through. As it also happens in actual systems (see, e.g. [9,27]), some capabilities can be passed while other, more critical,
ones cannot.
7.1. Variations on capabilities acquisition
In this section, we show an adaption of our framework that allows processes to acquire capabilities for themselves. We
start by presenting a scenario where all the dynamically acquired capabilities are assigned to single processes; then, we shall
combine together the possibility of granting capabilities to processes and to nodes.
7.1.1. Acquisition by processes
We start by modifying our framework to associate capabilities, in particular those dynamically acquired, to processes. To
this aim, we annotate located processes with a capability list that speciﬁes the capabilities they own. Thus, a process can
also use its own private capabilities, in addition to the capabilities of the executing node that are shared by all co-located
processes. Now, a μKlaim node is of the form l ::δ AC, whereAC is an annotated component generated from the following
syntactic productions
AC ::= 〈t〉 ∣∣ {{ P }}δ ∣∣ AC1|AC2
Notice that only process components can be annotated.
The operational semantics is changed to manage the acquisition of capabilities that now increases process annotations
while leaves policies of nodes unchanged. In the initial conﬁguration, all processes could have assigned the same empty
capability list or not, reﬂecting different capabilities for the processes. The adaptions are not surprising; they are in Table 8
and are reported in Appendix B. Notice that marked actions are now checked only against the capability list associated to
the process performing them (see rule (Mark’)); indeed, the capability list of the node does never change and has already
been used in the static checking phase.
Let us now brieﬂy revise the subscription example. If in the initial conﬁguration all processes have assigned the empty
capability list, the evolution of the net (1) according to the modiﬁed semantics leads to
lU ::[lU →C,lP →{o}] {{R }}[lS →{r}] ‖ lP ::[lP →C,lS →{o,i,r}] AP ‖ lS ::[ ] 〈paper1〉 | 〈paper2〉 | · · ·
where now R is the only process having the capability to access the papers stored at lS . Moreover, notice that the access
right o over lU delivered by AU to AP disappears upon completion of the parallel component running at lP that handles AU ’s
request. Indeed, at the end of its task such a component becomes {{nil }}[lU →{o}] and can be removed.
7.1.2. Acquisition by nodes and processes
In practice, a (mobile) process could acquire some capabilities and, from time to time, decide whether it wants to keep
them for itself or to share them with other processes running at the same node. A simple way to model both cases is to
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use different acquisition actions depending on whether the acquisition should be made on behalf of the node or of the
process. Hence, we could leave the operational semantics of actions in/read unchanged (i.e. as given in Section 4) apart for
the replacement of processes with annotated processes, add actions inpr(T)@u and readpr(T)@u to the syntax, and model
their operational semantics by using rules akin to (In’) and (Read’) in Table 8. In such a way, actions in/readwould increase
the capability list of the node where they are executed while actions inpr/readpr would increase the private capability list
of the executing process.
Of course, to control the newactions,we also need to introduce the corresponding access rights and to extend the ordering
relation over access rights. Furthermore, notice that, since node capability lists can dynamically change (like in the original
semantics), in rule (Mark’) the hypothesis {ar(a)} 	 δ1(l′) must be replaced by {ar(a)} 	 δ1(l′) ∪ δ(l′). Indeed, a marked
action can be enabled both by the capabilities accumulated by the process and by the capabilities offered by the hosting
node.
Correctness. We now sketch how the results of Section 5 can be adapted to the variation we have just presented (notice that
the setting of Section 7.1.1 is clearly an instance of themodel we develop here). The static checkingmechanism needs smooth
extensions: it should consider annotated processes and it should let rule (T-rcv) deal with actions inpr/readpr too. The ﬁrst
task can be carried out by adding the following inference rule:
(T-ann)
[δ] Ll P  P
 Ll {{ P }}δ  {{ P }}δ
Amarked annotated componentAC is an annotated component that may contain annotated marked processes of the form
{{ P }}δ . Then, the notions of admissible nets and executable nets are deﬁned like before, but take into account annotated
components.
Deﬁnition 7.1. A net is admissible if, for each node l ::δ AC, there exists a componentAC such that δ lAC  AC. A net
is executable if, for each node l ::δ AC, it holds that δ lAC  AC (abbreviated as δ lAC).
Finally, run-time errors are deﬁned accordingly, by letting rule (ErrAct) become
(ErrAct’)
{ar(a)} 	 δ(tgt(a)) ∪ δ′(tgt(a))
l ::δ {{ a.P }}δ′ ↑ l
Thus, correctness of the revised framework can be formulated and proved like in Theorem 5.7.
7.2. Managing loss of capabilities
In this section, we deal with some scenarios where capabilities can be lost. The three settings we shall present mainly
differ in the formal deﬁnition of capabilities and in the way in which capabilities are lost. The main common feature is that
the static checking mechanism is weakened since there are a lot of ingredients that can dynamically change. As it could be
expected, more ﬂexibility requires more run-time checks.
Since in this section we need to express capabilities removal, we introduce notation δ = δ1, δ2 to denote that δ can be
bipartitioned in δ1 and δ2. Formally, δ = δ1, δ2 means that δ = δ1[δ2] and, for each u ∈ dom(δ1) ∩ dom(δ2), we have that δ1(u) =
δ(u) − δ2(u) and δ2(u) = δ(u) − δ1(u). A similar notation is exploited also for grantings.
7.2.1. Consumption
If we interpret the ‘acquisition of capabilities’ as the ‘purchase of services/goods’, it is natural that a process will lose the
acquired capability once it used the service. For example, by paying the price of a book a user purchases one copy of the book;
if he wants another copy, he has to pay again. To enable multiple acquisitions and consumptions of capabilities, we should
be able to count the number of capabilities that nodes/processes have over each resource (this is somehow similar to ‘afﬁne’
types of [13]). To this aim, we modify our model by working with multisets of access rights, instead of sets; in particular, 
now denotes the set of the multisets built upon C (the set of access rights). All the operations over and relations between
sets used in this paper (i.e., union, subset inclusion, . . . ) must be considered as operations over and relations between
multisets.
We start considering the case of dynamic acquisition and consumption of capabilities only by processes from Section 7.1.1.
This means that node policies are statically known and left unchanged by the operational semantics. The operational rules
aremodiﬁed as reported in Table 9 (see Appendix B). Themain change is that process capabilities must be deleted whenever
used; this happens for actions out and eval, and when checkingmarked actions (see rules (Out”), (Eval”) and (Mark”)). Also
pattern matching needs to be modiﬁed; now, when it is invoked by l on T and t, it returns a triple 〈δ′′, σ , t′〉. The difference
is in the tuple t′ obtained by removing from the grantings within t all the capabilities granted to l (i.e., the capabilities
collected in δ′′). This is necessary otherwise repeated accesses to a tuple via actions readwould lead to a form of ‘capability
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Table 9
Consumption of capabilities: operational semantics.
(Out”)
[[ t ]]δδ1 = δ′1
l ::δ {{out(t)@l′ .P }}δ1 ‖ l
′ ::δ′AC′ l ::δ {{ P }}
δ′
1
‖ l′ ::δ′AC′|〈t〉
(Eval”)
δ1 = δ′1, δ
′′
1
δ′ l′ Q  Q
l ::δ {{ eval(Q )@l′ .P }}δ1 ‖ l
′ ::δ′AC′  l ::δ {{ P }}
δ′
1
‖ l′ ::δ′AC′|{{Q }}
δ′′
1
(In”)
match
δ[δ1]
l
(T , t) = 〈δ′′ , σ , t′〉
l ::δ {{ in(T)@l′ .P }}δ1 ‖ l
′ ::δ′ 〈t〉 l ::δ {{ Pσ }}
δ1[δ′′] ‖ l
′ ::δ′ nil
(Read”)
match
δ[δ1]
l
(T , t) = 〈δ′′ , σ , t′〉
l ::δ {{ read(T)@l′ .P }}δ1 ‖ l
′ ::δ′ 〈t〉 l ::δ {{ Pσ }}
δ1[δ′′] ‖ l
′ ::δ′ 〈t′〉
(Mark”)
l′ = tgt(a) δ1 = δ′1, [l
′ →{ar(a)}] l ::δ{{ a.P }}
δ′
1
‖ l′ ::δ′AC′ N
l ::δ {{ a.P }}δ1 ‖ l
′ ::δ′AC′  N
plus rules (New’), (Repl’), (Split′
1
) and (Split′
2
) from Table 8 and rules (Par) and (Struct) from Table 6
forging’. Indeed, each time a process at l reads t, the capabilities in δ′′ would be delivered to the process. Since the read can
be repeated several times (until 〈t〉 is available), it would be possible to acquire several times the capabilities δ′′.
Taking up the example of Section 6, we can now program the acquisition (and the consumption) of a ﬁxed number of
access rights r over the on-line repository. The user explicitly requires a number k of access rights r and the publisher
will charge on U’s credit card the cost of k accesses to its publications. The processes implementing these behaviours
are
AU  out(‘‘Subscr’’, lU : [lP → {o}],CrCrd, k)@lP .in(‘‘Acc’’, !x : {k × r})@lU .R
AP  * in(‘‘Subscr’’, !x : {o}, !y, !z)@lP .check credit card y of x and charge the cost for z accesses.
out(‘‘Acc’’, lS : [x → {z × r}])@x
where {k × r} stands for the multiset with k occurrences of capability r.
Correctness. Differently from Section 7.1, process capabilities do not play any role in the static checking (thus, rule (T-ann) is
missing): indeed, since they can also decrease, it is statically impossible to rely on them to determine whether a given action
will be legal at run-time or not. As an example, consider the net l ::[ ] {{ P|Q }}[l′ →{o}], where P  out(t)@l′ and Q  out(t′)@l′.
In this case, exactly one between P and Q will be able to perform action outwhile the other one will be blocked, depending
on the execution order. However, it is impossible to statically tell which one will evolve and which one will get stuck (and
hence both of them have to be marked).
Furthermore, the static semantics now has to mark all the actions, except those directly enabled by the access
policy of the node where the inference takes place. This is necessary to properly handle nodes like l ::[l′ →{i}] in(!u :
{o})@l′.out(·)@l′.out(·)@u, where action in should be the only unmarked one after static checking. Indeed, if we use the
checking of Section 3.2, the second action outwould not be marked. This could generate a run-time error if u is replaced by
l′ upon execution of the in: the acquired capability o, that enables execution of the second action out, would be consumed
to perform the ﬁrst action out.
Admissible and executable nets are formally deﬁned like in Deﬁnition 7.1; run-time errors are deﬁned like in Section 7.1.2,
i.e. by exploiting rule (ErrAct’). Correctness can be still stated and proved similarly to Theorem 5.7.
A more general framework. Finally, let us now brieﬂy consider the general setting where both processes and nodes can
dynamically acquire and consume capabilities (see Section 7.1.2). This scenario is the most expensive because the static
checking phase cannot be exploited at all and all actions must be checked at run-time. In fact, since also node capability
lists can dynamically change, it is impossible to statically determine if a given action will have the necessary capabilities at
run-time. Moreover, both the capability list associated to a process and the capability list of the node where the process is
running can provide the process with the capability necessary to perform a given action. In this case, the capability can be
removed from the capability list of the node or from the capability list of the process, and a strategy must be implemented.
The operational rules can be easily modiﬁed to control capabilities and remove the used ones; to save space, we do not show
the details.
7.2.2. Validity duration.
Another possible way of modeling capability lost is by introducing duration, as we already mentioned in the example of
Section 6. Each capability can be assigned a validity duration by indexing it with a natural number or with the symbol ∞
representing the period of time during which the capability can be used: a capability is available until its validity has not
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been expired. Thus, capability lists (and grantings)mapN to′, where′ is the powerset of C × (Nat ∪ {∞}) and it is ranged
over by ρ. For example, [l → {i10, o5, e∞}] expresses the fact that it is still possible to perform over l actions in for 10 time
units, actions out for 5 time units and actions eval forever. Access rights like e∞ will be called ‘persistent’ (notice that all the
access rights considered so far were indeed persistent).
Theoperational semanticsof thebasic frameworkneeds tobemodiﬁed tomodel timepassingand theeffectof timepassing
on validity durations. Because of the intrinsic asynchronous nature of our nets, we assume that time can pass differently
in different parts of the net but, at each node, time passes uniformly for all the processes running there (this modeling is
similar to web-π ’s one [42]). Moreover, we assume that time progresses in discrete time steps and label reductions with τ
to indicate the passing of τ time units.
Technically, all the rules in Table 6, except (Par) and (Struct), represent computational steps and are assumed to be
instantaneous; thus, the reductions occurring therein are labeled with ‘0’. The reductions contained in rules (Par) and
(Struct) are instead labeled with a generic label τ because they can stand for computational steps or time steps. The
following additional rule models time steps
(Time) l ::δ C τ l ::(δ)−τ (C)−τ
Function (·)−τ is deﬁned inductively as
(C1| C2)−τ  (C1)−τ | (C2)−τ
(〈t〉)−τ  〈t′〉 with t′ obtained from t by replacing each μ with (μ)−τ
[ ]−τ  [ ]
([l → ρ])−τ  [l → ρ′]
where ρ′ is obtained from ρ by:
• subtracting τ to all the durations, and
• deleting the access rights with a non-positive duration
(δ[δ′])−τ  (δ)−τ [(δ′)−τ ]
(μ[μ′])−τ  (μ)−τ [(μ′)−τ ]
and it is the identity function in all the other cases. Thus, it can be easily seen that when τ1 time units pass in l1 and τ2 time
units pass in l2, the net l1 ::δ1 C1 ‖ l2 ::δ2 C2 evolves as follows:
l1 ::δ1 C1 ‖ l2 ::δ2 C2
τ1 l1 ::(δ1)−τ1 (C1)−τ1 ‖ l2 ::δ2 C2
τ2 l1 ::(δ1)−τ1 (C1)−τ1 ‖ l2 ::(δ2)−τ2 (C2)−τ2
Correctness. Wecan statically control only the operations that are enabled by persistent access rights; all the other operations
have to be marked, since it is not possible to exactly know when they will be performed. In particular, all the actions having
a variable as target must be marked. Moreover, to avoid forging capability durations, we also need to ensure that a process
delivers a capability with duration τ only if the capability is persistent or has a duration at least τ in the capability list of the
node where the process runs.
These tasks can be achieved by deﬁning an ordering on ′, written 	
′ , as follows:
τ ′ ≤ τ
{cτ ′ } 	′ {cτ }
ρ1 ⊆ ρ2
ρ1 	′ ρ2
ρ1 	′ ρ′1 ρ2 	′ ρ′2
(ρ1 ∪ ρ2) 	′ (ρ′1 ∪ ρ′2)
Clearly , [[ · ]]δ ,matchδl (·, ·) andmarkL(·) now exploit this ordering. In particular, this fact implies that, since ar(a) returns an
access right that is not annotated, action a ismarkedwhenever a corresponding persistent capability ismissing in the current
checking context. On the other hand, rule (Mark) still invokes	 , that can be straightforwardly extended to annotated access
rights by ignoring durations.
The notions of admissible nets and executable nets are still deﬁned like in Deﬁnitions 3.6 and 5.1. Correctness is then
formulated and proved like in Theorem 5.7: it relies on the run-time errors deﬁned in Table 7, that are still deﬁned in terms
of 	 (properly extended to ignore validity durations). The only difference is that, in stating and proving subject reduction
(Theorem 5.5), we also need to consider time passing, i.e. reductions of the form
τ.
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7.2.3. Revocation
We shall now touch upon a scenario where capabilities can be revoked, i.e. a node can delete capabilities of other nodes.
To rule out obvious nasty attacks, we allow l to remove a capability list δ from l′ only if l has previously passed a list greater
than δ to l′ (notice that this complies with standard trends in discretionary access control models). In doing so, we have also
to take into account the fact that several nodes could have passed δ to l′.
We letS to be the set of the ﬁnite subsets ofN and we let s, s′, . . . to range overS. We now annotate access rights with
the identity of the deliverers, thus obtaining the set of annotated access rights ′, ranged over by ρ. Formally, ′ contains the
subsets of C ×S such that, if (c, s1) ∈ ρ and (c, s2) ∈ ρ, then s1 = s2. Statically assigned access rights take the form (c, ∅). We
let the preorder 	
′ on annotated access rights to be deﬁned by the following rules:
s1 ⊆ s2 ∨ s2 = ∅
{(c, s1)} 	′ {(c, s2)}
ρ1 ⊆ ρ2
ρ1 	′ ρ2
ρ1 	′ ρ′1 ρ2 	′ ρ′2
(ρ1 ∪ ρ2) 	′ (ρ′1 ∪ ρ′2)
Grantings are left unchanged, i.e. they are ﬁnite partial functions fromN to , while capability lists now use annotated
access rights.We use γ to range over these annotated capability lists that, formally, are ﬁnite partial functionsmappingN to
′. For example, the capability list [l → { (i, {l1}) , (o, {l2, l3}) }] used as access control policy of node l′ enables actions in/out
from l′ over l, and records that the capability i has been delivered by l1 while the capability o has been delivered by both l2
and l3. The ordering relation between annotated capability lists,′, is deﬁned like but relies on	′ instead of	 . If γ1 and
γ2 are annotated capability lists, the extension γ1[γ2] is the annotated capability list γ ′ such that
γ ′(u)
⎧⎨
⎩
γ1(u) if u ∈ dom(γ1) − dom(γ2)
γ2(u) if u ∈ dom(γ2) − dom(γ1)
γ1(u) + γ2(u) if u ∈ dom(γ1) ∩ dom(γ2)
where ρ1 + ρ2 is inductively deﬁned as follows:
∅ + ρ  ρ
{(c, s)} + ρ 
{{(c, s unionmulti s′)} ∪ ρ′ if (c, s′) ∈ ρ and ρ′ = ρ − {(c, s′)}
{(c, s)} ∪ ρ if (c, _ ) ∈ ρ
({(c, s)} ∪ ρ)+ ρ′  {(c, s)} + (ρ + ρ′)
We let s1 unionmulti s2 be s1 ∪ s2 if both si /= ∅, and ∅ otherwise. Underlying the deﬁnition of unionmulti there is the assumption that, if a
capability has been statically assigned to a given node (and hence one of the si is the empty set), then no other node will
ever be allowed to revoke it; a similar motivation inspired us the deﬁnition of 	
′ .
To enable capability revocations, we add action revoke(δ)@u to the syntax of μKlaim actions. The operational rules are in
Table 10 in Appendix B. Mainly, we have to deal with revocations: to this aim, we have to verify that the revoked capabilities,
δ, are present in the capability list γ ′ of l′ and that l was one of the grantors of δ in γ ′. To enforce this requirement we ‘sign’
a tuple with the identity of the producer; in this way, when capabilities contained in the tuple are acquired, the identity of
the granter is properly recorded to enable future revocations. This can be obtained by letting located tuples take the form
〈t〉l , where l is the producer of the tuple. Then, when a policy is updated after a read/in by exploiting capabilities passed by
a node l′′ (see rules (In”’) and (Read”’)), the received capabilities are annotated with l′′.
We now show two possible uses of revoke in the example of Section 6. The ﬁrst use consists in an alternative way of
implementing the subscription for a ﬁxed period of time d. Indeed, if we do not introduce validity durations as previously
shown, we can let P to manage timing information: once U’s capability r has expired, P can revoke it. A simpliﬁed process
AP implementing this behaviour is
AP  * in(‘‘Subscr’’, !x : {o}, !y, !d)@lP .
check c.c. y of x and require the payment for duration d.
out(‘‘Acc’’, lS : [x → {r}])@x.out(x, Today() + d)@l′P .B
B  * in(x, !s)@l′P .out(‘‘check’’, x, Today(), Today()≤s)@l′P .
( in(‘‘check’’, x, Today(), false)@l′P .revoke([lS → {r}])@x
| in(‘‘check’’, x, Today(), true)@l′P .out(x, s)@l′P )
where l′P is a reserved locality where P stores timing information (we have silently used basic values representing dates and
booleans, together with some obvious operations over them). Intuitively, process AP handles timing expirations by recording
in l′P the expiration date of U’s subscription, given by Today() + d. Then, process B repeatedly veriﬁes the validity of the
subscription by checking whether the current date, given by function Today(), is antecedent to the expiration date of U’s
subscription. When expired, the capability enabling the access to P’s papers is revoked.
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Table 10
Revocation of capabilities: operational semantics.
(Out”’)
[[ t ]]pol(γ )
l ::γ out(t)@l′.P ‖ l′ ::γ ′ C ′  l ::γ P ‖ l′ ::γ ′ C ′ |〈t〉l
(Eval”’)
pol(static(γ ′)) l′ Q  Q
l ::γ eval(Q )@l′.P ‖ l′ ::γ ′ C ′  l ::γ P ‖ l′ ::γ ′ C ′ |Q
(In”’)
match
pol(γ )
l
(T , t) = 〈δ, σ 〉
l ::δ in(T)@l′.P ‖ l′ ::δ′ 〈t〉l′′  l ::γ [δ{l′′ } ] Pσ ‖ l′ ::δ′ nil
(Read”’)
match
pol(γ )
l
(T , t) = 〈δ, σ 〉
l ::δ read(T)@l′.P ‖ l′ ::δ′ 〈t〉l′′  l ::γ [δ{l′′ } ] Pσ ‖ l′ ::δ′ 〈t〉l′′
(Revoke)
γ ′ = γ ′′ , δ{l}
l ::γ revoke(δ)@l′.P ‖ l′ ::γ ′ C ′  l ::γ P ‖ l′ ::γ ′′ C ′
plus rules (New), (Repl), (Split), (Par) and (Struct) from Table 6, with γ in place of δ everywhere.
[[ · ]]_ is deﬁned in Table 4 andmatch_l (·, ·) is deﬁned in Table 5
Another possible use of revoke in our example consists in revoking the access capability to a misbehaved user, e.g. a user
that sold the acquired capability r to a third part at a lower price. Notice, however, that evidence of U’s crime cannot be
implemented in our calculus; also in practice there would be an external authority entitled to discover the crime and inform
the publisher.
Correctness. Wenowadapt the static checkingmechanismof Section 3.2 to the new scenario. First, notice thatwe do not need
a speciﬁc capability to enable revoke: the operation is enabled only if l has previously delivered δ to l′, and this is checked at
run-time. Hence, the static checking mechanism is modiﬁed by using ′ in rule (T-new) and by adding the following rule:
(T-rev)
 Ll P  P
 Ll revoke(δ)@l′.P  revoke(δ)@l′.P
Like for the previous variations, the checking can only rely on statically assigned capabilities; indeed, annotated capabilities
can be revoked in unpredictable ways. Again, this forces us to also mark all those actions whose target is a variable because
we cannot know if the action will be enabled by a revocable capability or not.
Admissible and executable nets are deﬁned by relying only on statically assigned rights. To this aim, we use function
pol(γ ), that yields a simple capability list δ by deleting from γ all capability annotations, and static(γ ), that is the annotated
capability list obtained from γ by removing all the capabilities that have not been statically assigned.
Deﬁnition 7.2. A net is admissible if, for each node l ::γ C, there exists a component C such that
pol(static(γ )) l C  C
A net is executable if, for each node l ::γ C, it holds that
pol(static(γ )) l C  C
The deﬁnition of run-time errors now relies on the following variant of rule (ErrAct)
{ar(a)} 	 pol(γ )(tgt(a))
l ::γ a.P ↑ l
and correctness of the revised framework can be formulated and proved like in Theorem 5.7.
Notice that, here and in the other variations on capability loosing, the correctness theorems can be essentially proved
like in Section 5. This is due to the fact that, for the static checking mechanism, we only consider the capabilities that are
always available, i.e. those capabilities that cannot be consumed, that never expire and that cannot be revoked. The marking
mechanism, that does never give rise to run-time errors, is exploited whenever capabilities that can become unavailable are
required.
Possible extensions. The scenario we have just presented is perhaps the simplest way to model revocation of capabilities. We
conclude by touching upon more elaborated scenarios.
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• According to rule (Revoke), the process revoke(δ)@l′.P is stuck if only a list of capabilities less than δ is present in
γ ′. If we want to avoid this, we can adapt the operational rule for revoke to remove from γ ′ the greatest sublist of δ
delivered by l.
• The proposed formulation rules out direct attacks aimed at revoking as many capabilities as possible to reduce the
functionality of a system. These attacks can be mounted by executing actions revoke(δ)@l′ by a process running at l,
where l did not delivered δ to l′. However, one can easily imagine a scenario inwhich l spawns such amalicious process
over an l′′ that delivered δ to l′. A simpleway to avoid this is to deﬁne two checking systems: the ﬁrst one isl , the other
one, denoted byl , is deﬁned as the ﬁrst one but without rule (T-rev). We still use l in the deﬁnitions of admissible
nets and of executable nets, while we use l in rule (Eval): in this way we block incoming agents containing actions
revoke. This solution can however be over-restricting: a better (but more complex) solution is to deﬁne l in such a
way that revoke(δ)@l′ is deemed legal only if it is syntactically preceded by an action out delivering l′ some capability
list greater than δ.
• The last scenario we consider is when l1 delivers δ to l2 and then l2 delivers δ to l. Should it be legal for l1 to perform
an action revoke over l? In the current framework it is not. However, we could model this scenario by annotating
access rights with subsets ofS; each such subset would represent an unordered path leading to the acquisition of
the capability. E.g., if c is annotated with the set { {l1, l2} , {l′1, l′2, l′3} } in the annotated capability list of l, then c has been
delivered to l through l1 and l2 and, independently, through l
′
1
, l′
2
and l′
3
. Clearly, the semantics has to be modiﬁed to
enable all the lis and l
′
j
s to perform actions revoke over l.
7.3. Managing distribution of capabilities
We conclude by dealing with an orthogonal feature of capability-based access control systems, namely the ability of
controlling capability distribution. Usually, in discretionary access control models or in delegation-based trust models (see,
e.g., KeyNote [9] and SPKI [27]), some capabilities can be granted while some other ones cannot. Moreover, the ‘grantable’
capabilities can be passedwith an explicit indication that they cannot be further granted.We showhowdistribution of access
rights can be integrated in our basic model (Sections 3 and 4); integration in the more sophisticated scenarios presented in
this Section can be carried out similarly.
We start by deﬁning the set of labeled access rights to be C × {◦, •}, ranged over by λ; for notational convenience, we put
the labels ◦ and • as superscripts to access rights. Sets of labeled access rights are grouped in  that is ranged over by ξ .
Capabilities, capability lists and grantings are now deﬁned w.r.t.  instead of . Intuitively, an access right labeled with ‘◦’
is grantable, while an access right labeled with ‘•’ is not. Thus, the capability l → {i◦, o•} denotes the possibility of further
granting the access right i but not the access right o.
Resting on the idea that a grantable access right might also not be granted, while the converse must be avoided, we now
deﬁne the ordering on sets of labeled access rights, 	, as the least transitive relation closed under the following rules:
{c◦} 	 {c◦} {c•} 	 {c◦} ξ 	 ξ ∪ ξ ′
ξ1 	 ξ ′1 ξ2 	 ξ ′2
ξ1 ∪ ξ2 	 ξ ′1 ∪ ξ ′2
Notice that	 is not reﬂexive, because {c•} 	 {c•} does not hold. This is due to the fact that	 is used to govern capability
passing and that a non-grantable access right cannot be passed. Indeed, the checking of grantings in Table 4 and the ordering
on capability lists given in Deﬁnition 3.3 now exploit 	 instead of 	 . However, the run-time check of rule (Mark) and the
rules for run-time error in Table 7 still rely on 	 . Also the pattern matching in Table 5 relies on 	; in particular, rule (M2)
now becomes
ξ 	 δ(l′) ∪ μ(l) ar(ξ) = π
matchδl (! x : π , l′ : μ) = 〈[l′ → ξ ], [l
′
/x]〉
where, with abuse of notation, we use function ar(·) to also remove all labels from a set of labelled access rights.
Finally, we are left with the deﬁnition of extension of capability lists. To this aim, we let sup(·, ·) be the least reﬂexive and
symmetric function over labeled access rights such that sup(c◦, c•) = c◦. Function sup(·, ·) is then extended to sets of labeled
access rights as follows
sup(ξ1, ξ2) 
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
{λ} ∪ sup(ξ ′
1
, ξ2) if λ ∈ ξ1 and ξ ′1 = ξ1 − {λ}
and ∀λ′ ∈ ξ2 . ar(λ) /= ar(λ′)
sup(λ1, λ2) ∪ sup(ξ ′1, ξ ′2) if λ1 ∈ ξ1 and ξ ′1 = ξ1 − {λ1}
and λ2 ∈ ξ2 and ξ ′2 = ξ2 − {λ2}
and ar(λ1) = ar(λ2)
ξ2 if ξ1 = ∅
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Now, we let δ1[δ2] be the capability list δ such that
δ(u)
⎧⎨
⎩
δ1(u) if u ∈ dom(δ1) − dom(δ2)
δ2(u) if u ∈ dom(δ2) − dom(δ1)
sup(δ1(u), δ2(u)) if u ∈ dom(δ1) ∩ dom(δ2)
The rationale underlying this deﬁnition is that a non-grantable access right can be upgraded because of extension with the
corresponding grantable access right.
To test the impact that this variation has on the expressiveness of our model, we reconsider the example of Section 6. In
that scenario, every user could pass through the capability lS → {r} received by the publisher, thus acting as a tricky contender
of P. By exploiting labeled access rights, we can model P’s behaviour in a safer way by letting
AP  * in(‘‘Subscr’’, !x : {o}, !y)@lP .check credit card y of x and require the payment.out(‘‘Acc’’, lS : [x → {r•}])@x
Now, consider the net
N  lU ::δ Q ‖ lP ::[lP →C×{•},lS →{o• ,i• ,r◦}] AP ‖ lS ::[ ] 〈paper1〉 | 〈paper2〉 | · · ·
If we assume that
{e◦, e•} ∩ δ(lP) = ∅ and {e◦, e•, i◦, i•, r◦, r•} ∩ δ(ls) = ∅ (3)
then we can prove that, whatever process Q is, data at lS can only be accessed by lU in read-mode and after the payment
has been checked. Thanks to non-grantable access rights, this property also holds in N ‖ M, for everyM whose node policies
respect the assumptions made in (3) for the policy δ of lU .
The correctness of the resulting model can be easily established by following the steps presented in Section 5. To save
space, we omit the details.
8. Related work
Protection mechanisms for shared data-spaces coordination languages. Several protection mechanisms have been proposed for
shared data-space coordination languages that, like μKlaim, are based on Linda. Here, we describe the approaches closer to
ours and refer the interested reader to [28] for a survey of other approaches.
Someworksuse cryptographicmechanisms for protectingdata items, tuples and tuple spaces. For example, SecSpaces [36]
associates a label to any protected tuple specifying the key needed to unlock the tuple and the modality (i.e., via ‘read’ or ‘in’
operations) inwhich it can be accessed. Labels can be insertedwithin data ﬁelds, thus privileges can be dynamically acquired
troughcommunication. In [38], Lime (a framework forprogrammingadhocnetworksviamobileprocesses transiently sharing
tuple spaces) is enrichedwith a password-based access controlmechanism that permits the access to tuples and tuple spaces
only to theprocesses that knowtheappropriatepasswords. The initial passworddistribution ispossibly accomplishedoutside
of the application itself, while password exchanges are managed by the application. These programming choices are very
similar to the ones for μKlaim the we adopted in this paper.
Cryptographic keys, labels and passwords are similar approaches to protect single tuples, that overcome the impossibility
for capabilities to refer anonymous objects. An alternative approach is put forward in [60]with the introduction of Lindacap, a
Linda-like capability-based systemwithmulticapabilities.Multicapabilities provide apartitioning of a tuple-space and enable
certain operations to be performed on tuples of a speciﬁc group, but not on those of another group, even though both groups
have the same template. A multicapability may be copied to be passed to other processes; moreover, some operations on
capabilities are introduced (e.g., set-likeunion, intersectionanddifference). Similarﬁner-grainedcapabilities forμKlaimhave
been introduced in [34], where capabilities also specify a template for tuples, i.e. the argument of an operation in addition to
its type. The partitioning of the tuple spaces provided by multicapabilities can somehow bemimicked by exploiting μKlaim
dynamically created tuple spaces, although μKlaim lacks the combination calculus of multicapabilities. Moreover, Lindacap
only uses dynamic checking whereas μKlaim relies on both static and dynamic checking.
Distributed process calculi with protection mechanisms. A number of process calculi with distribution and mobility have been
equipped in the last decade with protection mechanisms based on, e.g., type systems [25,13,41,11,15], control/data ﬂow
analysis [47,48,26,40] and ﬂow logic [39].
The approach closest to ours is the one based on type systems. However, among the large amount ofwork on type systems
for resource protection in calculi with process distribution and mobility, only [51,22,12] handle dynamic modiﬁcation of
security policies. In [51] dynamic modiﬁcations of local knowledge of nodes are allowed, but must always respect a global
policy for the net. Thus, the global policy is ﬁxed at the beginning and does never change. The work in [22] somehow adapts
our approach to the Ambient Calculus, where local policies aremodiﬁed as an effect of ambientmobility. However, theway in
which an ambientmovementmodiﬁes a local policy is hardcodedwithin themoving ambient; this fact reduces the ﬂexibility
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of the approach. In [12] the authors develop a secure implementation of a typed π-calculus, in which capability-based types
are employed to regulate the access to communication channels and dynamically exchange access rights between processes.
High-level π-calculus processes are translated into low-level principals of a cryptographic process calculuswhich is a variant
of the ‘applied’ π-calculus [2]. The high-level type capabilities are implemented as term capabilities protected by encryption
keys only known to the intended receivers. As such, the implementation is effective even when the compiled, low-level
principals are deployed in open contexts for which no assumption on trust and behavior may be made. This approach is
reﬁned even further in [4,30] by implementing high-level functionalities directly using computational cryptography.
Other related approaches. Software capabilities have also been used to build a protection scheme for the Java environment
[37]. As in our framework, access rights can bedynamically exchanged via communications bymutually suspicious processes.
However, inourmodel capabilities aremadeavailable at theprogramming level (e.g. throughgrantings that areusedexplicitly
for exchanging access rights), while in loc. cit. access control is handled as a non-functional aspect deﬁned at the level of
application interface and is completely separated from the functional code of applications.
In [3], the access rights of a piece of code are determined by examining the attributes (e.g. accessed data, site of origin,
and so on) of the pieces of code that have run before and any explicit requests to augment rights. In other words, the access
rights of a process depend on the history of its execution and of control transfers among processes. Instead, we consider a
very simple and abstract process language and most of the ideas put forward by [3] do not apply. Some features, however,
can be easily integrated in our setting. For example, as we show in [34], we can set node policies to grant capabilities to
incoming processes according to the nodes spawning them, thus taking into account their execution history (i.e. the nodes
they have already passed through).
In the last fewyears, several security frameworks for open systems appeared in the literature [59,16,17,55,6] that, similarly
to ours, combine static and dynamic checks for efﬁciency and ﬂexibility matters. We linger on the most related approaches.
In [59], run-time principals are introduced for specifying information-ﬂow security policies also in terms of information
available at run-time (e.g., which principals will interact with the system). Dynamic checks are used to inspect run-time
principals to determine policy information not available at compile time. Similarly, in our setting, processes can exploit
capabilities dynamically acquired byweakening the static checking and by delaying some checks at run-time. In [17], secrecy
properties are guaranteed for a variant of theπ-calculuswith ﬁlesystemconstructs. The calculus supports both access control
checks and a form of static scoping that limits the knowledge of terms, including ﬁle names and contents, to groups of clients.
As in our approach, while the typing is static, it applies to a program subject to dynamic access-control checks. In [55] the
static and the dynamic approach to information ﬂow are compared, to better understand their strengths and weaknesses. In
general, since concrete values are known at run-time, run-time analyses can achieve greater precision and are more suitable
to support security policies that are deﬁned dynamically. On the contrary, static analyses must reject entire programs as
insecure, where a run-time system needs only reject insecure executions of a program, but are more efﬁcient. Our proposal
aims at taking advantage of both approaches by merging them.
Another related research line concerns the deﬁnition of languages for dynamically evolving security policies [18,57,7]. In
particular, [57] studies dynamic policies as channels that carry sensible information and develops a static type system that
ensures a form of non-interference. A similar research line is followed in [7]. In [18], a framework is presented where, when
analyzing a system statically, there may be available only partial knowledge of the structure of security policies. Similarly to
ours, the framework permits static reasoning even when only partial knowledge of the run-time security policy structure is
available.
To conclude, it has to be said that we have used a very simple policy language. A challenging issue for future research
is the extension of our framework for dealing with policies written in a more complex policy language as, e.g., one of the
languages surveyed in [1].
9. Conclusions
We presented μKlaim, a foundational calculus for network aware programming, and its capability-based access control
model. The latter permits controlling process mobility and enforcing protection of resources against misuse; moreover, it
enables access control management by governing the use of resources and selectively distributing capabilities to processes.
According to the terminology used in [53], our framework exploits a combination of static and dynamic checking, and of
in-lined reference monitoring implemented by marking those process actions that need run-time veriﬁcation. We have also
presented some variations of the basic framework that enable processes to acquire capabilities for themselves, take into
account capabilities loss and permit to constraint capabilities distribution. With respect to more traditional approaches
exploiting capability-based access control, preliminary static checks are introduced and performed everywhere possible to
increase efﬁciency. However, due to processmigration and dynamicmodiﬁcations of access control policies, run-time checks
are still largely used.
Ourmodel is largely independent from the underlying language and from the deﬁnition of access rights.More speciﬁcally,
it is possible to deﬁne amodel similar to the one forμKlaimwehavepresented in this paper,wheneverwehave: (i) a language
with a set of process operations and a set of corresponding access rights, (ii) an ordering relation over sets of access rights,
and (iii) some linguistic primitives for exchanging capabilities. For example, it is conceptually easy to adapt the current
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framework to the access rights used in [34], where ﬁner-grained capabilities are exploited (by taking into account also the
argument of an operation) andwhere a host can assign different privileges to processes coming from different nodes. Clearly,
these are orthogonal features that can be integrated in our framework; however, to keep the notations in this paper simple,
we have preferred to omit them.
Appendix A. Proofs of technical results
In this section we shall prove some technical results stated in the paper, namely Propositions 3.5, 4.2 and 4.3.
Proposition 3.5. For any , l, L, C and C ′ it is decidable to determine whether the judgment  L
l
C  C ′ holds true or not.
Proof. Weﬁrstly introduce the function #(C) that gives an upper bound to the number of checking rules thatmust be applied
to establish the validity of a judgment  L
l
C  C ′
#(C) 
⎧⎨
⎩
1 if C = 〈t〉 or C = nil
1+ #(P) if C = a.P or C = a.P or C = * P
1+ #(P1) + #(P2) if C = P1|P2
Notice that #(C) is always linear in the number of operators occurring in C, hence it is ﬁnite and does not depend on  or L.
We then prove the following lemma that trivially implies the thesis.
Lemma A.1. For any , l, L,C and C ′ the validity of judgment  L
l
C  C ′ can be established in at most #(C) inference steps. In
particular, exactly #(C) rules are needed to validate the judgment, while a smaller number is needed to disprove it.
Proof. The proof is by induction on #(C). The key observation is that the inference of the judgment  L
l
C  C ′ is driven by
the syntax of C itself; hence, at any step at most one rule can be applied.
Base case: #(C) = 1. We reason on the syntax of C.
C = 〈t〉. In this case, the only applicable static checking rule is (T-dat) that permits deducing  l 〈t〉  〈t〉. Thus, the
judgement  l C  C ′ is valid if, and only if, C ′ = 〈t〉 and this can be established in one step.
C = nil. The proof proceeds similarly, once we replace 〈t〉 with nil and (T-dat) with (T-nil).
Inductive case: #(C) > 1. We reason on the syntax of C.
C = a.P. We further distinguish the case where a is an action newloc from the case where a is another action.
a = newloc(l′ : δ). Due to the syntax of C, the only static checking rule that could be applied is (T-new). For
(T-new) to be applicable it must hold that δ   unionmulti [l′ → (l)]; otherwise,  L
l
C  C ′ would not hold. Moreover,
it must hold that C ′ = newloc(l′ : δ).P′ for some P′ such that [l′ → (l)] L∪{l′}
l
P  P′. Since, by deﬁnition,
#(C) = 1+ #(P), by induction we conclude that:
• if such P′ does not exist, then this can be determined by using less than #(P) steps, and hencewe can confute
 L
l
C  C ′ by using less than #(C) steps;
• otherwise, #(P) steps are needed for P and one step is needed to apply (T-new). Thus, we can validate
 L
l
C  C ′ by using #(C) steps.
a /= newloc(· · · ). We can only apply rules (T-snd) or (T-rcv). They both require C ′ = markL(a).P′ for some P′ such
that  L
l
P  P′ or upd (, arg(a)) L∪bn(arg(a))
l
P  P′, respectively. The thesis then follows by induction.
C = a.P. This case proceeds like the case for a /= newloc(· · · ) but uses (T-msnd)/(T-mrcv) in place of (T-snd)/(T-rcv).
C = C1| C2. The only checking rule that can be used in this case is (T-par). To this aim, C ′ must be of the form C ′1| C ′2 for
some C ′
1
and C ′
2
such that  L
l
Ci  C ′i for i = 1, 2. By using a straightforward induction on the latter judgments,
the thesis follows.
C = * P. The only checking rule that can be used in this case is (T-repl). To this aim, C ′ must be of the form * P′ for some
P′ such that  l P  P′. The thesis follows by induction. 
Proposition 4.2. If L  N L′  N′ and fn(N) ⊆ L then fn(N′) ⊆ L′.
Proof.We ﬁrstly prove a technical lemma.
Lemma A.2. If L  N L′  N′ and fn(N) ⊆ L, then L ⊆ L′ and fn(N′) − fn(N) = L′ − L.
Proof. That L ⊆ L′ immediately follows fromthedeﬁnitionof the reduction rulesbecause the set of localities in a conﬁguration
never decreases along reductions. To show that fn(N′) − fn(N) = L′ − L, we reason by induction on the length of the proof
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of L  N L′  N′. The only signiﬁcant base case is when rule (New) is used: in such case, L′ is obtained by adding to L the
newly created locality l′, which is the only locality in fn(N′) − fn(N). The inductive step is straightforward;when considering
rule (Struct), notice that, if N ≡ N′, then fn(N) = fn(N′).
Now, fn(N′) ∩ fn(N) ⊆ fn(N). Moreover, notice that fn(N) − fn(N′) might be not empty because some localities occurring in
N but not as addresses of network nodes may disappear in N′ due to inter-process communication. Hence, from Lemma A.2
we get fn(N′) = (fn(N′) − fn(N)) ∪ (fn(N′) ∩ fn(N)) ⊆ (L′ − L) ∪ fn(N) ⊆ (L′ − L) ∪ L′ = L′. 
Proposition 4.3. If N is well-formed and L  N* L′  N′ for fn(N) ⊆ L, then N′ is well-formed.
Proof. It is easy to prove, by induction on the rules, that the structural congruence≡ preserveswell-formedness of nets. Thus,
we are only left to prove that the reduction relation does never transform a well-formed net into a net where two distinct
nodes have the same address (indeed, the reduction rules could also be applied to nets that do not satisfy this property). To
this aim, we ﬁrst prove a Lemma stating that a single reduction step from a net N preserves the number of nodes having
the same address. This property is expressed by using clone(N) to denote the least number of nodes that should be removed
from N to yield a well-formed net. To formally deﬁne function clone(·), we exploit the auxiliary function mnl(·) (mnl stands
for ‘multiset of node localities’), that, when applied to a net, returns the multiset of localities naming the nodes of the net. It
is inductively deﬁned over the syntax of nets as follows:
mnl(l ::δ C) {|l|}, mnl(N1 ‖ N2) mnl(N1)  mnl(N2)
where {|l0, . . . , ln|} denotes the multiset with elements l0, . . . , ln and  denotes multiset union. Now, for any μKlaim net N,
we can deﬁne clone(N) as the cardinality of the multiset obtained by removing frommnl(N) one occurrence of each different
locality occurring in it.
Lemma A.3. If L  N L′  N′ then clone(N) = clone(N′).
Proof. We reason by induction on the length of the proof of the reduction L  N L′  N′. The base case is with axioms
(Out), (Eval), (In), (Read), (New) or (Repl), and it is trivial. In the inductive case, we reason by case analysis on the last
rule applied. The cases of rules (Mark), (Par) and (Struct) easily follow by induction: it can be easily seen that ≡ preserves
clone(·). Suppose now that the last applied rule is (Split) and let L  N1 L′  N2 be its premise. Then, due to the form of the
nets involved in the rule, we have clone(N1) = clone(N) + 1 and clone(N2) = clone(N′) + 1. Since the proof of L  N1 L′  N2
is shorter than that of L  N L′  N′, we can apply induction and deduce that clone(N1) = clone(N2), from which it follows
that clone(N) = clone(N′) that proves the thesis.
To conclude, note that a netN is well-formed if and only if clone(N) = 0. Hence, by using Lemma A.3 and by a straightforward
induction on the length of reduction sequences, the thesis easily follows. 
Appendix B. Formal deﬁnitions for the variations of Section 7
Deﬁnitions for Section 7.1.1. The structural congruence is modiﬁed by replacing rules (Alpha) and (Abs) in Table 2 with rules
(Alpha′)
P =α P′
l ::δ {{ P }}δ′ ≡ l ::δ {{ P′ }}δ′
(Abs′)
l ::δ AC ≡ l ::δ AC | {{nil }}δ′
The rules for the reduction relation are in Table 8.
Deﬁnitions for Section 7.2.1. The checking of grantings now deletes the capabilities passed in the tuple and returns the
capabilities left. Its formal deﬁnition updates Table 4 as follows:
μ = [li → πi]i=1,... ,k
δ1 = δ′1, [l →
⋃k
i=1(πi − δ(l))]
∀ i = 1, . . . , k . πi 	 (δ(l) ∪ δ1(l))
[[ l : μ ]]δδ1 = δ′1
[[ t1 ]]δδ1 = δ2
[[ t2 ]]δδ2 = δ3
[[ t1, t2 ]]δδ1 = δ3
Also the deﬁnition of function match must be updated; its new formulation relies on the following modiﬁcation of rule
(M2):
π 	 δ(l′) ∪ μ(l) μ = μ′, [l → (π − δ(l′))]
matchδl (! x : π , l′ : μ) = 〈[l′ → (π − δ(l′))], [l
′
/x], l′ : μ′〉
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where only the capabilities delivered by the tuple that are not already owned by the executing node are used to enrich the
policy of the executing process (this is needed to avoid delivering the process capabilities already in δ). As concerns (M1),
it is modiﬁed to additionally return the tuple passed as second argument to function matchδ
l
, while (M3) is modiﬁed to
additionally return the tuple resulting from the concatenation of the two tuples returned by its premises.
The rules for the reduction relation are in Table 9.
Deﬁnitions for Section 7.2.3. The rules for the reduction relation are in Table 10, where, for any u ∈ dom(δ), we let δ{l′′}(u) =
{(c, {l′′}) : c ∈ δ(u)}. Function pol(γ ) yields a simple capability list δ by deleting from γ all capability annotations; moreover,
static(γ ) denotes the annotated capability list obtained from γ by removing all the capabilities that have not been statically
assigned.
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